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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a practical method for testing monotone effects in games of complete and
incomplete information. Our method is nonparametric, based on restrictions arising from revealed
preference, and builds on the theory of monotone comparative statics developed in Milgrom and
Shannon (1994) and Quah and Strulovici (2009). These papers identify properties on payoff func-
tions (such as single crossing conditions) that are necessary and sufficient for optimal choices to
be increasing or decreasing with respect to exogenous variables. The empirically relevant followup
question is the following: what kind of observed choice behavior would be necessary and sufficient
for the recovery of payoff functions obeying single crossing or other key properties? This is the
question that we set out to answer, firstly in the context of a panel data set, where the choices of an
agent subject to different exogenous variables are observed, and secondly, in the context of a cross
sectional data set where the econometrician observes the distribution of actions of a population
under different exogenous conditions.
An important area of application of our results is to the study of entry games (as in Bresnahan
and Reiss (1990), Berry (1992), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)) and other games that arise in the
empirical IO literature. In the papers cited, firms’ entry decisions are modeled as games of com-
plete information, where each firm’s entry decision in a market is a best response to decisions taken
by other firms. The payoff functions are assumed to depend on observable variables in a specific
parametric fashion while the unobserved component is additively separable. The latter is heteroge-
nous across markets and belong to a known class of distributions. Entry decisions by firms across
many markets are observed, from which one could then estimate firms’ payoff functions. A major
issue in this work concerns the effects of strategic interaction and market characteristics: does the
entry of another firm encourage or deter entry? does an exogenous variable such as market size
encourage or deter the entry for a particular firm? Obviously, these questions are empirically im-
portant in themselves, but imposing sign restrictions on these effects could also facilitate estimation
procedures.1
1This information could be used to build a mapping from specific moments of the data to the identified set
of relevant parameters. For instance, in two-player games the sign of the strategic interaction parameters allows
us to identify outcomes that could occur only as a unique equilibrium; it follows that the probabilities of these
outcomes (conditional on various observable variables) do not depend on any equilibrium selection mechanism and
can be nicely related to payoff relevant parameters. (See, e.g., Tamer (2003) and Kline and Tamer (2016).) In
2
Our method allows us to test whether firms are playing pure strategy Nash equilibria, subject
to single crossing restrictions on its payoff functions. For example, we can test the hypothesis that
a firm’s entry into a market is encouraged when the market is large and it is discouraged when
another firm is also entering. Our method works without imposing any parametric assumptions
on payoff functions, without restricting the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity to particular
families, and without assumptions on equilibrium selection. To pass our test means that, with
sufficiently high probability, the data is a sample drawn from a population of markets where firms
with the hypothesized payoff functions play Nash equilibria. Our test requires rationalizability, in
the sense that we can recover a distribution on firms’ payoff functions (strictly speaking on their
preferences) that satisfy the single crossing restrictions we require and agrees with the observations.
Thus, when a data set passes the test, we can also form set estimates on the proportion of firms with
payoff functions belonging to a particular type and to make out-of-sample predictions on equilibrium
behavior.
Our approach is also useful in the context of Bayesian games, such as those studied by Sweeting
(2009) and De Paula and Tang (2012). Sweeting (2009) shows how we could estimate a Bayesian
game subject to payoff functions which depend parametrically on observable variables and also on
heterogeneous shocks (unobservable both to the econometrician and to other players). Our setup
is very similar, except that we make no parametric assumptions. We show how to test whether a
data set is rationalizable as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, subject to single crossing restrictions on
payoff functions. De Paula and Tang (2012) demonstrates how to recover the sign of interaction
effects in Bayesian games, without making parametric assumptions on payoff functions, so this is
close in spirit to what we do. However, De Paula and Tang’s test assumes that firms are playing
Bayesian Nash equilibria, while in our approach that assumption is part of the test, in the sense
that we require the recovery of a complete set of model primitives which are consistent with the
observations and with the single crossing assumptions.2
Broadly speaking, we see our revealed preference method as providing a useful tool that could
general, economically grounded shape restrictions improve both the identification and estimation of nonparametric
econometric models. Shape restrictions can reduce the size of the identified set of relevant parameters (see, e.g.,
Matzkin (2007)) and allows for the more efficient use of small sample data sets (see, e.g., Beresteanu (2005, 2007)).
2Since our test is more stringent, our data requirements are also (in a sense) more demanding than that in De
Paula and Tang (2012). See Section 5.2 for a detailed discussion.
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complement existing, mainly parametric, estimation strategies. For example, a model containing
only single crossing restrictions that passes our test will provide motivation for a more specific
version in which the impact of different factors enter parametrically and with sign restrictions.3 On
the other hand, a nonparametric version of the model that does not perform well in our test may
raise questions about the validity of the model or the suitability of the data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide an outline of how our approach works
in the context of an entry game. Section 3 focuses on individual decision making, and begins with
a quick survey of theoretical results on monotone comparative statics. Section 3.2 is the theoretical
heart of the paper, where we characterize panel data sets (of individual choices) which are consistent
with the single crossing property; this is achieved through a condition on the data set we call the
revealed monotonicity axiom. The rest of the section then explains how to extend the test for the
single crossing property to cross sectional data sets, in which we observe a distribution of actions
from a population of agents with heterogenous payoff functions. This extension (from panel to
cross sectional data) follows an approach that has been taken by other authors such as Manski
(2007). Manski (2007) also discusses out of sample predictions, and our approach to this issue is,
in its essentials, the same as his. In the case where the feasible action set available to all agents in
the population is unchanged across observations, we show that the single crossing property can be
characterized by an intuitive formulation involving first order stochastic dominance.
Section 4 extends the ideas of Section 3 to games, where we show how to test for pure strategy
Nash equilibria. The use of these results is then illustrated in Section 6, where we carry out an
empirical analysis of entry decisions made by airlines, using the data collected by Kline and Tamer
(2016); we show how strategic substitutability in airlines’ entry decisions can be tested using our
method, and also explain how we can recover information on the distribution of payoff functions
among airlines. More details on the empirical implementation can be found in the Online Appendix.
Section 5 explains how the results of Section 3 can be applied to Bayesian games. It is worth noting
that while the examples in this paper are largely taken from IO games, our overall approach can
be applied to other decision- or game-theoretic settings; for example, the authors have applied it to
study joint smoking behavior among married couples (see Lazzati, Quah, and Shirai (2018)).
3See footnote 1 on the advantages of imposing sign restrictions a priori.
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px1, x2q Firm 2N E
Firm 1
N PpN,N |x1, x2q PpN,E |x1, x2q
E PpE,N |x1, x2q PpE,E |x1, x2q
Table 1: Distribution of strategy profiles at px1, x2q
2 Motivating example
The seminal papers of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992) have given rise to a large
literature in empirical IO and structural econometrics that model oligopoly entry. In these models
there is a set of firms, N  t1, 2, ..., nu that may potentially operate in a given market. Firm i’s
action is denoted by yi P tE,Nu, where E means that the firm enters and N that it stays out. The
profit of firm i upon entry is determined by the entry decision of other firms and also by exogenous
factors. We denote its profit by Πi pyi,yi, xi, εiq, where yi are the choices of the other firms, xi
is a real-valued, finite-dimensional vector of exogenous profit shifters (that might be market- or
firm-specific) observed by all firms and also by the researcher, and εi are profit shifters observed by
all firms but not by the researcher.
Typically, it is also assumed that Πi has a linear functional form; for example, in Ciliberto and
Tamer (2009) it is assumed that
Πi pyi,yi, xi, εiq 
$&
% α
1
ixi  
°
ji δij1yj   εi if yi  E
0 if yi  N
(1)
where 1E  1 and 1N  0. Note that the entry of firm j alters the profit of firm i by δij. The
econometrician’s first objective is to estimate αi and δij (and hence Πi), based on the observed
entry decisions and profit shifters collected from a large cross-section of markets.
To be more specific, suppose there are just two firms, 1 and 2, both of which have payoff functions
of the form given by (1), and which interact with each other across many markets. For some given
value of the observable profit shifters px1, x2q, the econometrician observes the distribution of action
profiles in a large sample of markets. This is illustrated in Table 1, where PpE,N |x1, x2q denotes the
sample frequency of those markets where Firm 1 enters and Firm 2 stays out, when the observable
profit shifters take the value px1, x2q. (Obviously, the four entries in the table should add up to
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1.) Suppose that data of this form is collected at different values of px1, x2q; then it would be
possible to estimate αi and δij, under the following two assumptions: (1) at each market, each
pair of firms is playing a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a complete information entry game and
(2) the distribution of pε1, ε2q is independent of px1, x2q and belongs to a specific family, with its
parameters at least partially known. For a recent study of how these estimates could be obtained
from data in this format, see Kline and Tamer (2016).
In the empirical study of entry games, a major focus of attention is whether the entry decisions
of other firms and/or the movement of different profit shifters tend to encourage or discourage a
firm’s entry. (In the parametric form (1) this manifests itself in the signs of αi and δij.) It is on
precisely this issue that our paper makes a contribution: we develop a technique that allows us to
test hypotheses about the direction of impact of different variables on a firm’s entry decision, without
imposing a parametric form on its payoff function. We also do not require the unobservable profit
shifters pε1, ε2q to belong to any distribution family or to influence payoffs in an additively separable
way, though we maintain the assumption that its distribution is independent of the observable profit
shifters. In particular, we allow for ε1 and ε2 to be correlated with each other. In the event that a
data set is consistent with our hypotheses, our procedure also leads to the (set) estimation of the
primitives of the model that would generate the observations as pure strategy Nash equilibria.
2.1 Single crossing condition
To explain our approach in greater detail, suppose we wish to test the hypothesis that a firm’s entry
into a market is (1) encouraged when the profit shifter takes higher values and (2) discouraged
when the other firm chooses to enter. The crucial observation to make here is that this hypothesis
is precisely captured by the following simple condition, which is a version of the single crossing
property, on the firm’s payoff function:4
ΠipE, y1j, x1i, εiq ¡ ΠipN, y1j, x1i, εiq ùñ ΠipE, y2j , x2i , εiq ¡ ΠipN, y2j , x2i , εiq
whenever p1y2j , x2i q ¡ p1y1j , x1iq. In other words, if firm i prefers entering a market to staying out
when firm j is also entering, then this preference is preserved if there is an increase in xi or if firm
4Throughout this section we shall assume that preferences are always strict. Indifferences are dealt with carefully
in Section 3.
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x2  p0, 0q Firm 2N E
Firm 1
N 3/12 3/12
E 4/12 2/12
x2  p0, 1q Firm 2N E
Firm 1
N 1/12 5/12
E 3/12 3/12
x2  p1, 0q Firm 2N E
Firm 1
N 2/12 4/12
E 2/12 4/12
Table 2: Distribution of strategy profiles
j decides not to enter. In the case of (1), this holds if αi ¡ 0 and δij   0, but it is clear that such
a parametric form is not necessary for the single crossing property to hold.
To gain some intuition on how our approach works, let us ignore small sample issues for the time
being and suppose that we observe the true distribution of action profiles at some realized values
of px1, x2q. We claim that the joint hypothesis that firms have payoff functions obeying the single
crossing property and are playing pure strategy Nash equilibria is sufficient to impose restrictions
on the data. Indeed, consider an increase in the observable profit shifters from px11, x12q to px21, x22q;
then, at any realization of ε1, if firm 1 strictly prefers to enter when the other firm enters at px11, x12q,
the single crossing property guarantees that it will continue to prefer enter at px21, x22q. The same
argument applies to firm 2, and so we conclude that if pE,Eq is the Nash equilibrium at px11, x12q
for a given pair of firms, it will continue to be the unique Nash equilibrium at px21, x22q. Since the
distribution of pε1, ε2q is independent of the observable profit shifters, we conclude that5
PpE,E|x21, x22q ¥ PpE,E|x11, x12q.
This constitutes a restriction on the data that could be tested but it is certainly not the only restric-
tion imposed by our hypothesis. The tightest possible restriction is obtained by checking whether
the data set is rationalizable. This involves identifying those types of joint behavior (between the
two firms) which are consistent with Nash equilibrium play and profit functions obeying the sin-
gle crossing property, and then attributing weights to these types in a way that accounts for the
observed distribution of action profiles.
5Strictly speaking, we need to assume here that the probability of a firm being exactly indifferent between entering
and staying out is zero.
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Path Weight
x2  p0, 0q x2  p0, 1q x2  p1, 0q
Action profiles Action profiles Action profiles
N,N N,E E,N E,E N,N N,E E,N E,E N,N N,E E,N E,E
1 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12
2 2/12 2/12 2/12 2/12
3 2/12 2/12 2/12 2/12
4 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12
5 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12
6 2/12 2/12 2/12 2/12
7 3/12 3/12 3/12 3/12
Sum 1 3/12 3/12 4/12 2/12 1/12 5/12 3/12 3/12 2/12 4/12 2/12 4/12
Table 3: Distribution of types rationalizing data in Table 2
2.2 Rationalizability
To get a flavor of what testing for rationalizability involves, suppose that we observe the distribu-
tion over action profiles at three values of px1, x2q, as depicted in Table 2. Note that x1 is fixed
throughout, while x2 is two-dimensional and takes three values. We claim that these observations
can be rationalized by our model. To understand why this is the case, we list in Table 3 seven
possible group paths for a pair of Firms 1 and 2. For example, in group path 1, pE,Nq is played
by the two firms at x2  p0, 0q, with the firms switching to the Nash equilibrium pE,Eq when
x2  p0, 1q, and remaining at pE,Nq when x2  p1, 0q. It is straightforward to check that each of
these paths is compatible with single crossing, in the sense that one could find single crossing profit
functions for each firm, so that for each realized value of x2, the specified action profiles constitute a
(not necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium.6 Furthermore, when these paths are represented in the
population with the weights indicated in Table 3, they rationalize the distribution of action profiles
observed in Table 2. (Compare the entries in Table 2 with the last row of Table 3.)
More generally, the procedure for establishing the rationalizability of a data set (like that dis-
played in Table 2) consists of two steps. The first step consists of identifying all the group paths
which are compatible with the single crossing condition and the second consists of determining if
there is a distribution on these paths that explains the data. The second step is a computation-
ally straightforward linear programming problem, but solving the first step is generally non-trivial.
6For example, the following preferences will lead to the pure strategy Nash equilibria in group path 1: firm 1
prefers E to N irrespective of the other firm’s action and, irrespective of the action of firm 1, firm 2 prefers E to N
if x2  p0, 1q, while it prefers N to E at other realizations of x2.
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What is required is an easy-to-check property on observed actions which characterizes payoff func-
tions that obey the single crossing property: this is fundamentally a theoretical question and it is
addressed in the Section 3 and 4.7
Lastly, it is worth noting that our model can accommodate behavior which is disallowed by the
parametric specification. Indeed, the data in Table 2 cannot be explained by profit functions of the
form (1), in which Firm 2’s profit upon entry will be
Π2pE, y1, x21, x22q  α21x21   α22x22   δ211y1   ε2, (2)
where pα21, α22q ¡ 0 and δ21   0.8 The essential reason for this is the following: when Π2 has
the form (2), whether the boost to profits of an increase in x21 is greater or smaller than that
obtained from the same increase to x22 depends on whether α21 is bigger or smaller than α22 and
is independent of the realization of ε2. So it excludes the case where the realization of ε2 influences
the relative benefit of higher x21 versus higher x22. To see why the parametric model cannot explain
the data in Table 2, suppose instead that it does. Then
PpE,E|x1, p1, 0qqPpE,E|x1, p0, 0qq  µ ptε1 : Π1pE,E, x1, ε1q ¥ 0u  tε2 : δ21 ¥ ε2 ¥ α21  δ21uq ,
where µ is the probability measure on the space of pε1, ε2q; similarly,
PpE,E|x1, p0, 1qqPpE,E|x1, p0, 0qq  µ ptε1 : Π1pE,E, x1, ε1q ¥ 0u  tε2 : δ21 ¥ ε2 ¥ α22  δ21uq .
Since the former equals 2{12 while the latter equals 1{12, we conclude that α22   α21. However,
1
12
 PpN,N |x1, p0, 0qqPpN,N |x1, p1, 0qq  µ ptε1 : Π1pE,N, x1, ε1q ¤ 0u  tε2 : 0 ¥ ε2 ¥ α21uq
7The seven paths listed in Table 3 are only some of the possible group paths consistent with single crossing. For
example, suppose firm 1 prefers E to N if and only if firm 2 chooses N , and firm 2 prefers E to N if and only if
x2  p0, 1q and firm 1 chooses N . These preferences lead to two group paths, because there are two Nash equilibria
at x2  p0, 1q. One is Path 4, where pE,Nq is always chosen. The other path involves pE,Nq being played at
x2  p0, 0q and x2  p1, 0q, and pN,Eq being played at x2  p0, 1q; this path is not among those listed.
8We are grateful to Aureo De Paula for suggesting that we construct an example with this specific feature.
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and
2
12
 PpN,N |x1, p0, 0qqPpN,N |x1, p0, 1qq  µ ptε1 : Π1pE,N, x1, ε1q ¤ 0u  tε2 : 0 ¥ ε2 ¥ α22uq
which tells us that α22 ¡ α21. So we obtain a contradiction.
3 Revealed monotone choice
This section focuses on the single-agent model. Section 3.1 gives a quick survey of basic results on
monotone comparative statics. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical result underpinning the whole
paper: imagining a panel data set of choice behavior, it gives a necessary and sufficient condition
under which it is generated by an agent choosing with a preference obeying the single crossing
property. Section 3.3 explains how the results in Section 3.2 could be applied to repeated cross
sections of choices made by a population of agents with such preferences.
3.1 Basic concepts and theory
Let Y be the set of all conceivable actions of a given agent. We assume it is either the real line R
or a closed subset of R such as the natural numbers. The agent selects an action from a subset A of
Y . A set A is said to be an interval of Y if, for every y1, y2 P A with y1   y2, we have that
y P Y and y1   y   y2 ùñ y P A.
Throughout this paper, we assume that observed feasible sets are compact intervals, where com-
pactness is with respect to the Euclidean topology on R. In this case, any compact interval A will
have a largest element y2 and a smallest element y1 so we may write it as A  ry1, y2s. We denote
the collection of compact interevals by IpYq.
The choice of the agent over different actions in a feasible set A is affected by a set of covariates
z P Z. We assume pZ,¥q is a partially ordered set. (For the sake of notational simplicity, we
are using the same notation for the orders on Y and Z and for any other ordered sets; we do not
anticipate any danger of confusion.) We refer to pz, Aq as the agent’s environment.
A binary relation Á on YZ is a preference relation if, for every fixed z, it is reflexive, transitive,
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and complete. That is, py2, zq Á py1, zq means that y2 is weakly preferred to y1 when the covariates
are z.9 The asymmetric part of Á (the strict preference) is denoted by ¡. At the environment
pz, Aq P Z  IpYq, the best response or optimal choice of the agent is the set
BRpz, Aq  ty1 P A : py1, zq Á py, zq for all y P Au. (3)
The preferenceÁ is regular if BRpz, Aq is nonempty and compact for all pz, Aq P ZIpYq. Regularity
holds trivially in the important case where every bounded set of Y is finite (e.g., when Y  N) and,
more generally, it holds if Á is continuous at every z.
Oftentimes (and, indeed, in the previous section) it is convenient to think of the agent as having
a payoff function, which is a real-valued map Π on Y  Z. Clearly, this induces a preference
Á on Y  Z, where py2, zq Á py1, zq if Πpy2, zq ¥ Πpy1, zq. Then BRpz, Aq  arg maxyPA Πpy, zq
and we can speak of the payoff function being regular, etc., if the preference it induces has the
corresponding property. Since observed choices only reveal ordinal information, it is appropriate
that our discussion in this subsection and the next should focus on preferences. In Section 3.3, we
shall revert to using payoff functions, so as to follow the convention in much of the econometric and
structural IO literature.
The best response BRpz, Aq is said to be increasing in z if, for every z2 ¡ z1,
y2 P BRpz2, Aq and y1 P BRpz1, Aq ùñ y2 ¥ y1. (4)
The preference Á is said to obey strict interval dominance (SID) in py; zq if, for every y2 ¡ y1 and
z2 ¡ z1,
py2, z1q Á py, z1q for all y P ry1, y2s ùñ py2, z2q ¡ py1, z1q.
The following result is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 1 in Quah and Strulovici (2009).
Basic Theorem. Suppose an agent has a regular preference Á on Y  Z. Then BRpz, Aq is
increasing in z P Z at every A P IpYq if and only if Á obeys SID in py; zq.
9Note that this is not a standard definition of a ‘preference’ since we do not require it to be complete on Y Z.
We could define it in the standard way but that does not seem like a meaningful thing to do given that, in our setting,
even if the agent truly has a preference between py, zq and py1, z1q where z  z1, this will never be revealed since she
never chooses between these two alternatives.
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Readers familiar with the theory of monotone comparative statics will notice that our definition
of monotonicity in (4) is stronger than the standard notion, which merely requires that BRpz2, Aq
dominates BRpz1, Aq in the strong set order.10 This weaker notion of monotonicity can be charac-
terized by preferences obeying interval dominance (rather than strict interval dominance), which
can be defined as follows: for every y2 ¡ y1 and z2 ¡ z1,
py2, z1q Á p¡q py, z1q for every y P ry1, y2s ùñ py2, z2q Á p¡q py1, z2q (5)
(see Theorem 1 in Quah and Strulovici (2009)). Throughout this paper we have chosen to work
with a stronger notion of monotonicity; the weaker notion does not permit meaningful revealed
preference analysis because it does not exclude the possibility that an agent is simply indifferent to
all actions at every z. In this sense, our stronger assumption here is analogous to the assumption of
local non-satiation made in Afriat’s Theorem.11 In the case where Y is discrete, it is quite natural
to assume that the agent has a strict preference; in that context, there is no distinction between
interval dominance and strict interval dominance.
The interval dominance order is Quah and Strulovici’s (2009) generalization of the concept of
single crossing differences, due to Milgrom and Shannon (1994).12 Just as there is strict interval
dominance, so there is a strict version of single crossing differences. A preference Á obeys strict
single crossing differences (SSCD) if, for every y2 ¡ y1 and z2 ¡ z1,
py2, z1q Á py1, z1q ùñ py2, z2q ¡ py1, z2q. (6)
It is clear that SSCD implies SID, and hence the Basic Theorem applies if Á obeys SSCD. In fact,
it is known that the stronger SSCD property leads to a stronger conclusion: if Á obeys SSCD then
BRpz2, Aq is increasing in z, for any nonempty set A, whether or not it is an interval.13
Consider the entry model in Section 2. For simplicity, let us assume the payoff shifter xi for
10A set B2 dominates B1 in this order if, for every b2 P B2 and b1 P B1, b2 _ b1 P B2 and b2 ^ b1 P B1.
11It is clear that without such an assumption, any type of consumption data is rationalizable since one could
simply suppose that the consumer is indifferent across all consumption bundles. For a statement and proof of
Afriat’s Theorem see Varian (1982).
12Milgrom and Shannon (1994) actually use the term ‘single crossing property’; our reference to it as ‘single
crossing differences’ follows Milgrom (2004).
13For a more detailed discussion of the connections, see Quah and Strulovici (2009).
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player i is scalar, representing the size of the market, and that αi ¡ 0 and δij   0 for all j  i.
In this case, firm i’s payoff upon entry increases with xi (market size) and diminishes as more
firms enter the market; formally, Πi pyi,yi, xi, εiq is increasing in zi  pyi, xiq, for every εi.
This guarantees that at every possible realization of the unobserved payoff shifter εi, firm i’s payoff
function, Πi pyi,yi, xi, εiq, obeys SSCD in pyi; ziq. It follows from the Basic Theorem that if the
firm chooses to enter the market at some zi  z1i then it will also choose to enter when zi  z2i ¡ z1i.
3.2 Revealed Monotonicity Axiom
We consider an observer who records the actions chosen by an agent under a finite set of environ-
ments. The data set can be denoted by
O    yt, zt, At : t P T  t1, 2, ..., T u( ,
where at observation t, the agent chooses yt in the environment pzt, Atq. (Note that we allow for
the agent to make different choices in the same environment, so it is possible for pzt, Atq  pzs, Asq
and yet yt  ys.)
Definition 1. O is rationalizable if there is a regular preference Á on Y  Z such that for each
t P T , we have pyt, ztq Á py, ztq for every y P At.
Our aim in this subsection is to characterize data sets that are rationalizable by preferences that
obey SID in py; zq. Our motivation is clear: if O is rationalizable by an SID preference then there
is a regular preference that can both account for the observed behavior of the agent and guarantees
that the optimal choice of the agent based on this preference is increasing in the covariates on any
feasible action set in IpYq (including environments outside the observations tpzt, AtqutPT ).
Example 1. Consider a firm (for example, a power generator) producing a perishable good, whose
production in each period depends on the spot price for its output and the forward contracts it
has already signed. The observation at period t is pyt, zt, Atq, where yt ¥ 0 is the firm’s output,
zt ¥ 0 the spot price, and At  ry¯t, Ks, where y¯t is the amount the firm had already committed to
supplying (at a price or prices which are not part of the observation) and K is the firm’s capacity.
Suppose that in each period t, the firm chooses y ¥ y¯t to maximize zpy  y¯tq  Cpyq, where C is
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the cost of producing y. Then the data set O  tpyt, zt, AtqutPT is rationalizable by a preference on
output-price pairs py, zq P R  R  that obeys SID in py; zq. Indeed, it is clear that we can choose
the preference to be that induced by the payoff function Πpy, zq  zy  Cpyq.
To determine whether a data set is rationalizable by an SID preference, we first define the
revealed preference relations induced by O. The direct revealed preference relation ÁR is defined
as follows: py2, zq ÁR py1, zq if py2, zq  pyt, ztq and y1 P At for some t P T . The indirect revealed
preference relation ÁRT is the transitive closure of ÁR, i.e., py2, zq ÁRT py1, zq if there exists a finite
sequence y¯1, y¯2, ..., y¯k in Y such that
py2, zq ÁR py¯1, zq ÁR py¯2, zq ÁR ... ÁR py¯k, zq ÁR py1, zq. (7)
The motivation for this terminology is as follows. If the agent is optimizing according to some
preference Á and, at some environment pz, Aq the agent selects y2 when y1 P A, then it must be
the case that py2, zq Á py1, zq. Furthermore, given that Á is transitive, if py2, zq ÁRT py1, zq then
py2, zq Á py1, zq. We are now ready to introduce the axiom that characterizes rationalizability by
an SID preference.
Definition 2. O  tpyt, zt, AtqutPT obeys the Revealed Monotonicity (RM) axiom if, for every
s, t P T ,
zt ¡ zs, yt   ys, and pys, zsq ÁRT pyt, zsq ùñ pyt, ztq ÃRT pys, ztq.
Remark: Suppose that O is such that At  A  Y for all t P T . Then it is clear that the RM
axiom holds if and only if the optimal action is increasing in the covariates in the following sense:
yt ¥ ys for any two observation t, s P T such that zt ¡ zs.
It is clear that the RM axiom is a non-vacuous restriction. So long as the dataset is finite,
checking whether O obeys this property is a finite problem and indeed there are no computational
difficulties, either theoretical or practical, associated with the implementation of this test. It helps
with motivation at least to see why the RM axiom is a necessary condition.
Proposition 1. Suppose O  tpyt, zt, AtqutPT is rationalizable by a preference Á that obeys SID
in py; zq. Then O obeys the RM axiom.
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Proof. We first establish that ÁRT has what we call the interval property. In general, a binary
relation R on Y  Z has this property if py2, zqR py1, zq implies py2, zqR py, zq for any y between
y2 and y1, i.e., either y1   y   y2 or y2   y   y1.
If py2, zq ÁR py1, zq, then there is At such that y2  yt and y1 P At. Since At is an interval, it
is clear that py2, zq ÁR py, zq for any y between y2 and y1. Now suppose py2, zq ÁRT py1, zq, but
py2, zq ÃR py1, zq. Then, we have a sequence like (7). Suppose also that y2 ¡ y1 and consider y
such that y2 ¡ y ¡ y1. (The case where y2   y1 can be handled in a similar way.) Letting y0  y2
and yk 1  y1, we know that there exists at least one 0 ¤ m ¤ k such that ym ¥ y ¥ ym 1.
Since pym, zq ÁR pym 1, zq, it must hold that pym, zq ÁR py, zq. This in turn implies that py2, zq 
py0, zq ÁRT py, zq, since py0, zq ÁRT pym, zq. So we have shown that ÁRT has the interval property.
Suppose there are observations s and t such that zt ¡ zs, yt   ys, and pys, zsq ÁRT pyt, zsq
holds. The interval property guarantees that pys, zsq ÁRT py, zsq for all y P ryt, yss. Since O is
rationalizable by an SID preference Á, we have pys, zsq Á py, zsq for all y P ryt, yss. The SID
property on Á guarantees that pys, ztq ¡ pyt, ztq, which means that pys, ztq £RT pyt, ztq. QED
Of course, our more substantial claim is that the RM axiom is also sufficient for rationalizability
by an SID preference. In fact, an even stronger property is true: whenever a dataset obeys the RM
axiom, then it is rationalizable by an SSCD (and not just SID) preference.14
Theorem 1. The following statements on O  tpyt, zt, AtqutPT are equivalent:
(a) O is rationalizable by a preference that obeys SID in py; zq.
(b) O obeys the RM axiom.
(c) O is rationalizable by a preference that obeys SSCD in py; zq.
As a very simple illustration of the use of this theorem, consider the following example.
Example 1 (continued). Suppose there are just two observations, py1, z1, A1  ry¯1, Ksq and
py2, z2, A2  ry¯2, Ksq, with z2 ¡ z1 and y¯2   y¯1. In other words, the output price is higher and the
14This phenomenon, which may seem surprising, is not unknown to revealed preference analysis; for example, it
is present in Afriat’s Theorem. In that context, the data consist of observations of consumer’s consumption bundles
at different linear budget sets. If the agent is maximizing a locally non-satiated preference, then the data set must
obey a property called the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP, for short); conversely, if a data set obeys
GARP then it can be rationalized by a preference that is not just locally non-satiated but also obeys continuity,
strong monotonicity, and convexity.
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output commitment lower at the second observation. Suppose y¯1   y2   y1, then the RM axiom
is violated since py1, z1q ÁR py2, z1q and py2, z2q ÁR py1, z2q. On the other hand if y2   y¯1   y1,
then the RM axiom holds, because the only revealed relation is py2, z2q ÁR py1, z2q and thus these
observations can be rationalized by an SID preference that obeys SID in py; zq. Note that for any
such preference Á, the SID property implies that py2, z1q ¡ py1, z1q but this does not contradict the
optimality of y1 in ry¯1, Ks.
It would be natural to speculate given Theorem 1 that, if we allow At to be arbitrary subsets of
Y (rather than intervals), then the RM axiom is necessary and sufficient for rationalizability with
SSCD preferences. It is clear that the axiom will be necessary for rationalizability in this sense, but
sufficiency does not hold.
Example 2. Let Y  tu, v, wu with u   v   w, and let A1  tu,wu, A2  tu, vu, and A3  tv, wu.
Note that A1 is not an interval of Y . Suppose that z1   z2   z3. Then pw, z1q ÁR pu, z1q,
pu, z2q ÁR pv, z2q, and pv, z3q ÁR pw, z3q. The indirect revealed preference relation ÁRT is equal to
the direct revealed preference relation ÁR in this example and, clearly, this set of three observations
obeys the RM axiom. However, it cannot be rationalized by an SSCD preference. Suppose, instead,
that an SSCD preference Á rationalizes the data. Then, it must be that pw, z1q Á pu, z1q and, by
SSCD, pw, z2q ¡ pu, z2q. In addition, we have pu, z2q Á pv, z2q and so pw, z2q ¡ pv, z2q. SinceÁ obeys
SSCD, we get pw, z3q ¡ pv, z3q, which contradicts the direct revealed preference pv, z3q Á pw, z3q.
The RM axiom is an easy-to-understand property written in a form of no-cycling condition
(which is reminiscent of GARP in Afriat’s Theorem or the congruence axiom in Richter’s Theorem),
and the necessity of the axiom is relatively straightforward to show. Given the superficial familiarity,
a reader could be forgiven for thinking that its sufficiency is also obvious. But there is more than
what meets the eye in Theorem 1 and intuition can be misleading; indeed, any correct intuition
will have to distinguish between arbitrary constraint sets and interval constraint sets because, as
Example 2 demonstrates, the result is not true in the former case. The proof of the sufficiency
of the RM axiom does proceed in a way which is vaguely familiar, in the sense that we extend
ÁRT further by relying on strict interval dominance, and then take the transitive closure of that
extended revealed preference relation. While this seems like a natural approach to take, the issue
is whether the resulting incomplete revealed preference relation is actually well-behaved enough to
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admit a completion that obeys SSCD or even SID, since the added requirements on the preference
means that we cannot simply appeal to Szpilrajn’s Theorem (or some other standard theorem)
to complete the relation. The heart (and substantive part) of the proof lies in showing that the
revealed preference relation does have the properties that allow for a completion that obeys SSCD.
This in turn relies crucially on the observed constraint sets being intervals; indeed, Kukushkin,
Quah, and Shirai (2016) provide an example of an incomplete preference ordering that obeys SSCD
(which can be interpreted as arising from a data set with non-interval constraint sets), for which
there is no completion that also obeys that property.
In the case where Y is finite, it is obvious that any SID preference on Y  Z can be represented
by a payoff function Π : Y Z Ñ R, in the sense that Πpy1, zq ¥ p¡qΠpy, zq if py1, zq Á p¡q py, zq.15
The next result asserts that such a representation generally exists.
Proposition 2. Suppose Y is a closed interval of R and that O obeys the RM axiom. Then O is
rationalizable by a preference that obeys SSCD in py; zq and admits a payoff representation.
Up to this point in our discussion, we have allowed for the possibility that an agent’s preference is
indifferent between two actions. It is sometimes convenient, especially in the case where Y consists
of a finite set of actions, to rule out the possibility of indifference; in other words, for any py, zq
and py1, zq either py, zq ¡ py1, zq or py1, zq ¡ py, zq. To characterize rationalizability by a strict SID
preference would necessarily entail a strengthening of the RM axiom.
Definition 3. O obeys the Strong Revealed Monotonicity (SRM) axiom if, for every s, t P T ,
zt ¥ zs, yt   ys, and pys, zsq ÁRT pyt, zsq ùñ pyt, ztq ÃRT pys, ztq.
Notice that this property strengthens the RM axiom by imposing the following additional condi-
tion: it excludes the possibility that pys, zsq ÁRT pyt, zsq and pyt, ztq ÁRT pys, ztq when zt  zs and
yt  ys. Clearly, this exclusion is needed for rationalizability by a strict preference. The following
result is the analog to Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 for strict preferences.
15Note that there is a difference between our notion of ‘representation’ here and the textbook definition because
Á is not a complete binary relation on X  Z: it need not compare elements with distinct z. So the representation
requirement is also confined to elements py1, z1q and py, zq where z1  z.
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Theorem 2. The following statements on O  tpyt, zt, AtqutPT are equivalent:
(a) O is rationalizable by a strict preference that obeys SID in py; zq.
(b) O obeys the SRM axiom.
(c) O is rationalizable by a strict preference that obeys SSCD in py; zq.
In the case where Y is a closed interval of R, the strict SSCD preference in (c) can be chosen to
have a payoff representation.
3.3 Cross-sectional data
So far we have assumed that the observer has access to panel data that gives the actions of the
same agent across different environments. We now consider the case where data of this type is
not available; instead, we only observe the distribution of actions taken by a population of agents,
with possibly heterogeneous preferences, under different environments. It is possible to extend our
revealed preference analysis to this stochastic setting, provided we assume that the distribution
of preferences is the same in populations subject to different environments or, put another way,
environments are assigned randomly. Throughout this section, we shall assume Y is finite, but bear
in mind that the set of covariates can still be infinite.
The cross-sectional data consists of a finite set of environments and an associated distribution
of choices for each of them. We can thus denote it as
P   Pp|zt, Atq : t P T  t1, 2, ..., T u(
where Ppy|zt, Atq is the fraction of agents who choose action y in environment pzt, Atq. It almost goes
without saying that P is an idealized data set, in the sense that we assume that the distributions
observed in P are true population distributions; in practice, we do not observe P but rather some
sample which approximates P . In this section, as well as the next two, we shall be abstracting from
this specifically statistical issue and focus on idealized data sets. In the final, empirical section,
finite sample issues will be addressed using the approach of Kitamura and Stoye (2016).
There is no loss of generality in assuming that all agents in the population have payoff functions
(rather than just preferences), and so we shall present our results in that way, to make its connection
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with the empirical and econometric literature clearer. We introduce heterogeneity in the population
via a term ε P E ; one could think of ε simply as a parameterization of the payoff functions defined on
Y  Z. For a type ε, its payoff function is Πp, εq : YZ Ñ R. Each agent in the population knows
its own type, but this is not directly observed by the econometrician. We denote a distribution on E
by F. Since indifferences are allowed, the set BRpz, A, εq  arg maxyPA Πpy, z, εq may be non-unique.
A selection rule at pε, tq P E  T is a conditional probability on Y with support on BRpzt, At, εq;
specifically, λ py | ε, tq gives the probability that y is chosen by type ε at the observation t.
Definition 4. P is stochastically rationalizable (or, when there is no ambiguity, simply rationaliz-
able) if there is E , regular payoff functions Πp, εq : Y Z Ñ R for all ε P E , a selection mechanism
λ, and a distribution F on E such that
Pr
 
y|zt, At  » λ py | ε, tq dFpεq for each t P T . (8)
In other words, there is a distribution F on a family of payoff functions that accounts for the
distribution of actions at each observed environment, assuming that agents choose from their best
response set according to a selection rule.16 This notion of rationalizability coincides with what
Manski (2007) calls a linear behavioral model. The models of Marschak (1960) and McFadden and
Richter (1991) are models of this type; see Manski (2007) for a discussion and other examples.
Our objective here is to formulate a test of rationalizability with payoff functions Πp, εq that
obey SID in py; zq. Before we do that we must introduce the notion of a path, which is a sequence of
choices y   y1, y2, ..., yT  where yt P At for all t P T . A path y is said to obey the RM axiom
if the induced data set tpyt, zt, AtqutPT obeys the RM axiom. By Theorem 1, this guarantees that
the induced data set can be rationalized by an SID (and indeed by an SSCD) preference. Since Y
is finite, it is in principle possible to determine the entire set of paths that obey the RM axiom; we
denote this set by Y. The next result is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 1 and provides
a way of testing whether or not a data set P is rationalizable by SID preferences.
Theorem 3. P is rationalizable by payoff functions with the SID property in py; zq if and only if
16Note that the selection mechanism can vary across observations, in the sense that λpy|ε, tq and λpy|ε, sq may
not be equal, even when the environments are identical, i.e., pyt, Atq  pys, Asq. In other words, our definition
of rationalizability does not restrict which elements in the best response set are picked, and indeed allows for the
possibility that the agent will choose differently when the same environment is repeated.
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there exists a probability distribution Q on Y such that
Ppy|zt, Atq 
¸
yPY 1
 
yt  yQ pyq for each y P At and all t P T . (9)
When Q exists, it is possible to choose E to be finite and the payoff functions to obey SSCD.
Proof. Suppose P is rationalizable. Let Ppy, εq be the probability that an agent of type ε chooses
the path y (in the sense that the agent chooses action yt at observation t). Note that Ppy, εq 
Tt1λpyt|ε, tq. Since the agent ε has an SID payoff function, Theorem 1 guarantees that Ppy, εq ¡ 0
only if y obeys the RM axiom. Then the proportion of the population who choose the path y is³
Ppy, εqdFpεq; if we set this as Qpyq, it is clear that (9) holds.
Conversely, suppose Q exists that solves (9). We can list, in any particular order, the finite
set of paths which have positive probability under Q. Let Πpy, z, 1q be an SID payoff function that
rationalizes the first path on the list, Πpy, z, 2q an SID payoff function that rationalizes the second
path, and so on. Then E  t1, 2, . . .u is a finite set and let the distribution F assign a weight of
Qpyε q to the type ε, where yε is the path rationalized by Πpy, z, εq. Let λpy|ε, tq  1 if y  ytε , and
let λpy|ε, tq  0 otherwise; in other words, the type ε chooses ytε at observation t with certainty.
Then (9) guarantees that (10) holds. QED
This theorem sets out a procedure that allows us to determine whether a cross-sectional dataset is
rationalizable by SID/SSCD payoff functions. First, we need to determine the set of all paths y that
satisfy the RM axiom, and then we solve the linear equations given by (9). The implementability
of this procedure in practice will depend crucially on the number of observed environments in the
data and the ease with which we could work out the set Y. Notice also that a solution to (9) is
a distribution on Y, and because (9) is a linear family of equations, the collection of distributions
on Y that solve this family form a convex set. This set can be non-unique; when that occurs the
distribution over payoff functions that rationalizes the data can also be non-unique. In other words,
in this environment, the primitives of the model can typically only be partially identified.
In the special case where the feasible action sets are fixed across all observed environments,
a path y  py1, y2, ..., yT q obeys the RM axiom if and only if yt ¥ ys whenever zt ¡ zs.
In this case, it is clear that Pp|zt, Aq will first order stochastically dominate Pp|zs, Aq whenever
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zt ¡ zs, because every type in the population will be taking a weakly higher action. Less obviously,
the converse is also true, so that monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance
characterizes rationalizability with SID preferences when the feasible action set is fixed.
Theorem 4. Suppose that P satisfies At  A  Y for all t P T . Then P is rationalizable by SID
payoff functions if and only if Pp|zt, Aq ¥FSD Pp|zs, Aq for all s, t P T such that zt ¡ zs.
There are analogous versions of Theorems 3 and 4 for the case of rationalizability by strict SID
preferences. In the case of the former, the result holds, provided we require Q to have its support
on Y, the set of paths obeying the SRM axiom. In the case of Theorem 4, the characterizing
property requires, in addition, that Pp|zt, Aq  Pp|zs, Aq for all s, t P T such that zt  zs. We
leave the reader to fill in the details.
Theorems 3 and 4 will be applicable in Section 5 (see, in particular, Theorem 8), where we study
the rationalization of Bayesian Nash equilibria. In that context, a data set consists of observations
of the distribution of actions of a player in different game environments, and the covariates will be
(1) the player’s observable characteristics and (2) some statistic of the actions of other players, such
as their average action. (Thus the covariates will be at least two-dimensional.)
3.4 Related results
Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.8.9) considers a correspondence ϕ mapping elements of a totally ordered
set (which can be interpreted as the set of covariates) to compact sublattices of R`. He shows that
this correspondence is increasing in the strong set order if and only if it can be exactly rationalized by
a payoff function that is supermodular in the choice variable and has increasing difference between
the choice variable and the covariates. By ‘exactly rationalized’ we mean that the optimal choices
at some value z of the covariate must coincide with (rather than simply contain) ϕpzq. In the case
where ϕ is a choice function, it is not hard to see that such a rationalization is possible even when
the covariates form a partially (rather than totally) ordered set; this has been noted by Carvajal
(2004) who applies this to a game setting.
Throughout this paper, we also permit the set of covariates to be partially rather than totally
ordered; this is crucial in game theoretic applications, where the covariates will include the actions
of other players in the game and thus will not generally be totally ordered. However, we confine
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ourselves to the case where actions are totally ordered (in essence, elements of R rather than R`),
while allowing for observations of the choices made from different subsets of the set of all possible
actions. Consequently, the observer may have partial information on the agent’s ranking over
different actions rather than simply the globally optimal action. In this respect, the problem we
pose is more complicated than the one posed by Topkis, because the rationalizing preference we
construct has to agree with this wider range of preference information (in addition to obeying single
crossing differences).
Echenique and Komunjer (2009) considers a structural model where there could be multiple
outcomes (which could be optimal choices made by an agent or equilibrium outcomes). It shows
that a monotone relationship between the exogenous and dependent variables in the structural
function leads to observable restrictions on the tail quantiles of the dependent variable. The issue
of rationalizability is not addressed.
Apesteguia, Ballester, and Lu (2017) characterize a random utility model where the distribution
of actions on any feasible set is generated by a set of preferences that are totally ordered by single
crossing differences. The model we study in the previous subsection can also be interpreted as a
random utility model; however, the rationalizability of a data set P does not require the population’s
preferences to be totally ordered by single crossing differences (i.e., in terms of our notation, we
do not require Πpy, z, εq to have single crossing differences in py; εq). The single crossing property
tested in the previous subsection is between actions and (observable) covariates, an issue which is
not addressed in Apesteguia, Ballester, and Lu (2017).
There is a significant empirical literature on the endogenous adoption of (possibly) complemen-
tary technologies within the firm. Unlike our contribution, that literature is not always concerned
with the recovery of payoff functions and, to the extent that it is, it uses parametric models (see,
for example, Athey and Stern (1998)).
4 Monotone choice in games
This section extends the results in the previous section to analyze games of complete information.
The first three subsections focus on games with strategic complements. The final subsection extends
these ideas to games with strategic substitutes, etc.
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4.1 Pure strategy Nash equilibrium
Let N  t1, 2, ...., nu be the set of agents in a complete information game, with Yi (a closed subset
of R) being the set of all conceivable actions of agent i. Player i has a feasible action set Ai which
is a compact interval of Yi, with the set of all such intervals denoted by IpYiq. Agent i’s payoff
over different feasible actions is affected by the actions of other players and also by an exogenous
variable xi, which is drawn from a partially ordered set pXi,¥q. We refer to xi as agent i’s observable
characteristics since it is observed by other players in the game and also by the econometrician.
Note that if there are observable features of the game that affect all players, this could simply be
folded into xi for each i, since Xi can be multi-dimensional.
To connect this setup with the previous section, let Zi  YiXi with Yi  jiYj. A typical
element of Zi is denoted by zi  pyi, xiq and Zi is a partially ordered set if we endow it with the
product order. Player i has a regular preference Ái on YiZi (for all i P N ). Given these preference,
we denote by Gpx,Aq the game arising when the joint feasible action set is A  ni1Ai P IpYq
(where IpYq denotes ni1IpYiq) and the profile of observable characteristics is x P X (where X
denotes ni1Xi). We refer to px,Aq as a game environment. We say that the family of games
G  tGpx,Aqupx,AqPXIpYq obeys strategic complementarity if, for every A P IpYq, the best response
of each agent i (as given by (3)) is monotone in zi  pyi, xiq. Games of strategic complementarity
have a number of properties that make them particularly well-behaved; the most important for
our purposes is that it always has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (see Milgrom and Roberts,
1990). It follows immediately from the Basic Theorem that the family of games G obeys strategic
complementarity if and only if Ái is an SID preference for every agent i.
Our objective is to develop revealed preference tests of the hypothesis that agents are playing
games of strategic complementarity. We begin with the case where the observer has access to panel
data, where the joint actions selected by the agents under a finite set of game environments are
observed. Specifically, at observation t, the players choose an action profile yt from the feasible
action set At, when the covariates are xt. Thus the data set is
O    yt,xt,At : t P T  t1, 2, ..., T u( .
Definition 5. O is rationalizable as pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) if, for each agent i P N ,
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there is a regular preference Ái on Yi Yi  Xi such that, at each t P T , we have pyti ,yti, xtiq Ái 
yi,y
t
i, x
t
i

for every yi P Ati.
If O is rationalized as PSNE by a profile of preferences tÁiuiPN such that Ái obeys SID in
pyi; ziq where zi  pyi, xiq then the Basic Theorem guarantees that the resulting family of games
G obeys strategic complementarity. Characterizing data sets with this rationalizability property is
straightforward given the results of the previous section. By letting zti  pyti, xtiq, we can construct
from O a ‘personalized’ dataset Oi  tpyti , zti , AtiqutPT for each agent i. The following result follows
immediately from Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. O  tpyt,xt,AtqutPT is rationalized as PSNE by tÁiuiPN , such that Ái obeys SID in
pyi; zi  pyi, xiqq if and only if Oi obeys the RM axiom for each i P N .
Example 3. Suppose that Y1  Y2  t0, 1u, X1  X2  t0, 1u, and that O has two observations:
at observation 1, y11  y12  1, x11  x12  0, and A11  A12  t0, 1u; and
at observation 2, y21  y22  0, x21  x22  1, and A21  A22  t0, 1u.
In the case of a single agent and when the set of feasible actions is fixed across observations, the
RM axiom is equivalent to the co-monotonicity of the observed action with the covariates. Clearly,
co-monotonicity is violated here since the observed action profile falls from p1, 1q to p0, 0q, as the
covariates increase from p0, 0q to p1, 1q. Nonetheless this data set is rationalizable as PSNE by SID
preferences. By Theorem 5, it suffices to show that O1 and O2 obey the RM axiom. The two
observations of O1 are the following:
at observation 1, y11  1, z11  p1, 0q, with A11  t0, 1u; and
at observation 2, y21  0, z21  p0, 1q, with A21  t0, 1u.
O1 trivially obeys the RM axiom (since z11 and z21 are not comparable), and similarly so does
O2. More directly, it is straightforward to check that the following SID preferences rationalize the
data: for agent 1, p0, 0, x1q ¡1 p1, 0, x1q and p1, 1, x1q ¡1 p0, 1, x1q for any x1; in other words, agent 1
prefers coordinating on the same action with the other player irrespective of the exogenous variable.
Similarly, for agent 2, p0, 0, x2q ¡2 p1, 0, x2q and p1, 1, x2q ¡2 p0, 1, x2q. With these preferences, p0, 0q
and p1, 1q are Nash equilibria when the covariates are (0,0) and also at (1,1).
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4.2 Cross sectional data sets
We now extend our analysis to the case where we observe cross sectional data. Specifically, the data
consists of a finite set of game environments and at each environment we observe the distribution
of action profiles taken by a population of groups. Each group consists of n players, with a player
in role i, for i  1, 2, . . . , n. As in Section 3.3, we now specialize to the case where Yi is finite, for
all i (while Xi may still be infinite). A typical data set can thus be denoted as
P   Pp|xt,Atq : t P T  t1, 2, ..., T u(
where Ppy|xt,Atq is the fraction of groups in the population who play the action profile y in game
environment pxt,Atq.
Given that Yi is finite, there is no loss of generality in assuming that an agent in role i has a
payoff function (rather than just a preference). Heterogeneity among agents in this role is captured
by a term εi P Ei, which parameterizes the payoff functions. For a type εi, we denote its payoff
when it chooses action yi, given that others are playing yi, and the observable characteristics
are xi by Πipyi,yi, xi, εiq. We refer to ε  ni1εi as a group type and denote the set of group
types by E  ni1Ei. Given a group type ε and a game environment px,Aq, let NEpx,A, εq be
the corresponding set of PSNE; note that we are assuming that the players in a group know each
other’s type and are playing a game of complete information. A selection rule at pε, tq P E  T
is a conditional probability on Y with support on NEpxt,At, εq; specifically, λ py | ε, tq gives the
probability that the profile y is played by the group type ε at the observation t.
Definition 6. P is stochastically rationalizable (or simply rationalizable) if there is Ei and payoff
functions Πi : p, εiq Ñ R for each role i and type εi P Ei, a selection mechanism λ, and a distribution
F on the set of group types E  ni1Ei such that
Pr
 
y|xt,At  » λ py | ε, tq dFpεq for each t P T . (10)
In other words, the distribution of action profiles at each observation can be accounted for by
a distribution F over group types (which does not vary across observations) and a selection rule
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over the PSNE of each group type. It is worth emphasizing that since we impose no restrictions at
all on F, we are allowing for the possibility that groups are not formed randomly. For example, in
two-player games, the probability that a role-1 player belongs to a particular type can depend on
the type of role-2 player to which that role-1 player is paired.
We would like to formulate a test for the rationalizability of P with payoff functions that obey
the SID property, in the sense that we require Πip, εiq to obey SID in pyi; pyi, xiqq, for every role
i and every type εi. The test provided by Theorem 3 for single-agent decision problems could be
naturally extended to a game-theoretic setting.
We refer to a sequence of joint action profiles y   y1,y2, ...,yT , where yt P At for all
t P T , as a path. Abusing terminology a little, we say that this path obeys the RM axiom if, for
every i, the induced panel data set Oi  tpyti , zti , AtiqutPT (with zti  pyti, xtiq) obeys the RM axiom.
We denote the set of paths that obey the RM axiom by Y. Since Y is finite, it is in principle
possible to find all the paths in Y. Note that, by Theorem 5, if a path y obeys the RM axiom
then tpyt,xt,AtqutPT is rationalizable as PSNE with SID payoff functions. The next result is
analogous to Theorem 3 and has a similar proof (which we shall omit).
Theorem 6. P is rationalizable with payoff functions that obey the SID property if and only if there
exists a probability distribution Q on Y such that
Ppy|xt,Atq 
¸
yPY
1
 
yt  yQ pyq for each y P At and all t P T . (11)
When Q exists, it is possible to choose the set E to be finite and the payoff functions to obey SSCD.
There is an analogous version of Theorem 6 for the case of rationalizability by strict SID prefer-
ences: it is necessary and sufficient for Q to have its support on Y, the set of paths that obey the
SRM axiom, by which we mean that, for every i, the induced panel data set Oi  tpyti , zti , AtiqutPT
(with zti  pyti, xtiq) obeys the SRM axiom.
In Section 2, we gave an example in Table 2 of a data set P with three observations and tested
whether it is SID-rationalizable (with the order of Firm 2’s strategies reversed). The paths listed
in Table 3 obey the SRM axiom and a distribution Q that satisfies (11) is provided by the second
column in that table.
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In Section 6, we illustrate the use of Theorem 6 by applying it to data on the entry behavior
of airlines. Readers who are keen to scrutinize the results of that application can skip to Section 6
immediately after reading Section 4.3. In fact there are many other potential empirical applications
of our approach. In a related note, we apply Theorem 6 to test for the presence of spousal influence
in smoking decisions (Lazzati, Quah, and Shirai, 2018).
4.3 Inference and out-of-sample predictions
Theorem 6 tells us that a data set P is rationalizable by payoff functions that obey SID if and
only if there is a distribution Q over Y that solves (11). Beyond testing the model, we may wish
to know more about the set Q, and thus about the types that form the population generating P .
To be specific, suppose we are interested in the proportion of the population with paths belonging
to some set Y1  Y. (For examples of this type see the application in Section 6.) Since the
set of distributions Q that solve (11) will typically be a non-singleton convex set, this proportion
cannot be predicted uniquely. The largest (smallest) proportion which is data-consistent could be
obtained by maximizing (minimizing) the linear objective
°
yPY1 Qpyq subject to (11). We could
then conclude that the true proportion of the population with paths in Y1 can lie anywhere between
these two numbers, since the solution to (11) is convex.
Another natural exercise is to make out-of-sample predictions. Suppose P  tPp|xt,AtqutPT
is rationalizable with SID payoff functions and we wish to predict the distribution of outcomes
at some game environment px0,A0q (while maintaining the SID property on payoff functions). In
other words, we would like to identify those distributions Pp|x0,A0q (with their support on A0)
such that the augmented stochastic data set P Y tPp|y0,A0qu is rationalizable by payoff functions
that obey SID. Let Ppx0,A0q be the set of these distributions; this set can be obtained using the
following procedure.
Let φ : Y Ñ A0 be any map such that the path pφpyq,yq, on the game environments
tpx0,A0qu Y tpxt,AtqutPT obeys the RM axiom. It follows from Theorem 6 that Pp|x0,A0q is in
Ppx0,A0q if and only if there is φ and a distribution Q on Y such that (11) holds and
Ppy|x0,A0q 
¸
yPY
1 pφpyq  yqQ pyq for each y P A0. (12)
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Note that Pp|x0,A0q exists because both Q and φ exists, the former because P is rationalizable with
SID payoff functions and the latter because any game of strategic complementarity has PSNE.17
4.4 Other classes of games
The tests we have outlined for games of strategic complementarity could potentially be applied
to classes of games that require other monotone properties on a player’s strategic choice. It could
certainly be applied to two-player games of strategic substitutes, since these games could be thought
of as games of strategic complements, once we reverse the order of the strategy of one of the two
players. It could also be applied to games of strategic substitutes more generally: instead of checking
whether a player i has SID preferences in pyi; pyi, xiqq, we could check whether the player has SID
preferences in pyi; pyi, xiqq, which will guarantee that this player’s action decreases with the
actions of other players. There is, however, a caveat: while games with strategic complementarity
always have pure strategy Nash equilibria, this is not true for games of strategic substitutes. So
while it is possible to test whether a given set of observations is consistent with PSNE in the
latter class of games, one may argue that the hypothesis itself is less plausible since there is no
general PSNE existence result for these games. Furthermore, even if preferences could be found
that rationalizes a data set as PSNE in games of strategic substitutes, these preferences may not
guarantee the existence of PSNE outside the set of observed environments tpxt,AtqutPT ; in other
words, there may be difficulty in making out-of-sample PSNE predictions. The bottom line is that
when we are testing a hypothesis that a set of observations consists of PSNE of games belonging to
a particular class, it would be desirable for that class of games to have PSNE in general.
Another natural variation on the tests we have developed involves making stronger hypotheses
on the way actions taken by other players impact a player’s payoff. For example, in the entry
model discussed in Section 2, we may hypothesize that firm i cares about the number of other firms
that enter the market, irrespective of their identity. If the firm’s payoff function has the linear
form given by (1), this is equivalent to assuming that δij is the same across all j. The analogous
condition in our nonparametric setting is to require the SID property in pyi; p
°
ji yi, xiqq (in the
case of strategic complements) or the SID property in pyi; p
°
ji yi, xiqq (in the case of strategic
17Since y obeys the RM axiom, Theorem 5 guarantees that it admits a rationalization with SID preferences, and
these preferences generate a nonempty set of PSNE in the game environment px0,A0q (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).
Let φpyq be any PSNE in this environment; then pφpyq,yq obeys the RM axiom (again by Theorem 5).
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substitutes). Theorem 6 could be straightforwardly adapted to test such a hypothesis.
5 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In Section 4.2, we consider an idealized cross sectional data set of the form P  tPp|xt,AtqutPT
and find necessary and sufficient conditions under which it could be rationalized by a population
of groups playing complete-information games with strategic complementarity. In this section, we
consider a data set of the same form and investigate its rationalizability as Bayesian Nash equilibria.
5.1 Payoffs and game structure
The players N  t1, 2, . . . , nu play a simultaneous game. Each player i has a preference over its
own actions that depends on its observable characteristic xi and on its type εi. Unlike Section 4,
εi is now private information and unknown to the other players. We assume that this preference
is also affected by the player’s belief on the actions of other players; we allow this belief to be
non-deterministic, so it takes the form of a distribution ρ on Yi. The impact of this belief on
the agent’s preference is captured by the expected value of some function gi : Yi  Xi Ñ Rni ;
note that we have not excluded the possibility that the player’s preference depends directly on yi
since we can always set gipyi, xiq  yi but this formulation allows us to build in simpler forms of
interaction, for example, by setting gipyi, xiq 
°
ji yj. The function gi is known to the players in
the game and also to the econometrician; crucially, this means that, if ρ is the distribution on yi
observed in the data set, then the expected value of gi given ρ, i.e., Eρpgi|xiq 
³
gipyi, xiqdρpyiq,
is also known to the econometrician.
Let Bi be the convex hull of the image of gi. We assume that a player i of type εi P Ei has a
payoff function Πip, εiq : Yi  Bi  Xi Ñ R such that if the player’s belief over Yi is given by ρ,
then the payoff of action yi when the observable characteristic is xi is
Πipyi,Eρpgi|xiq, xi, εiq. (13)
In other words, the player’s payoff can be captured by a function defined on the expected value of
gi. This is a nonstandard assumption: if Πipyi, gipyi, xiq, xi, εiq is the (ex post) payoff to player
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i when other players are playing yi then the payoff when he has a belief ρ on yi is typically
understood to be the expected value, which is
³
yiPYi
Πipyi, gipyi, xiq, xi, εiq dρpyiq and not (13).
However, many of the payoff functions assumed in the estimation of Bayesian games do have the
property that the expected value equals (13).18 This is obviously true for the payoff functions in
the entry model discussed in Section 2, where gipyi, xiq  yi (see (1)). Another instance where
this property obviously holds is the following payoff function
Πipyi,yi, xi, εiq  aipyi, xi, εiq  
mi¸
k1
cki pyi, xi, εiq gki pyi, xiq,
where ai, c
k
i and g
k
i are real-valued functions; this is a generalization of the payoff function used in
Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi (2016) where it is assumed that
Πipyi,yi, xi, εiq  aipyi, εiq   cipyi, εiq gipyi, xiq,
with ai, ci and gi being real-valued functions, and ai and ci independent of xi.
We assume that the distribution of types for player i obeys the independence property, by which
we mean that the distribution of εi can depend on some of player i’s observable characteristics, but
cannot depend on the characteristics of other players, or on their types. Specifically, we suppose
that Xi  rXi  X¯i, with a typical element having the form xi  px˜i, x¯iq and allow the distribution
of εi to depend on x˜i, but to be independent of px¯i,xi, εiq. Note that we allow for the possibility
that x¯i is absent (the case where all of i’s characteristics will affect the distribution of εi) and also
the case where x˜i is absent (the case where none of i’s characteristics affect the distribution of εi).
That a player’s private type is independent of the type of other players is widely assumed in the
econometric literature on Bayesian games; in fact most estimation strategies also assume that εi is
additively separable from the non-stochastic component of the payoff function and to belong to a
known parametric family.
We denote the distribution of εi by Fip, x˜iq : Ei Ñ R. The agent i chooses an action from its
feasible action set Ai after observing εi, so its strategy is a map σi : Ei Ñ Ai. Given the strategies
18An exception is Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010), where the non-stochastic part of the payoff
function is nonparametric and may not satisfy the property we require. In that model, however, the private type is
additively separable and has a known distribution, requirements which we do not impose.
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of other players, σi, the distribution of their types Fip, x˜iq, the payoff of an agent i of type εi
is Πipyi,EFipgipσiq|xiq, xi, εiq where
EFipgipσiq|xiq 
»
Ei
giprσjpεjqsji , xiqdFipεi, x˜iq.
A profile of strategies pσˆiqiPN forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in the game environment
px,Aq if, whenever εi is in the support of Fip, x˜iq,
Πipσˆpεiq,EFipgipσˆiqq, xi, εiq ¥ Πipyi,EFipgipσˆiqq, xi, εiq for all yi P Ai. (14)
Suppose gi is an increasing function and Πipyi, bi, xi, εiq has the SID property in pyi; biq (for all
i P N). Let us consider what happens when σj increases pointwise (for all j  i), in the sense that
player j’s action at every type εj is higher. Then bi increases because gi is increasing and this in
turn leads to player i’s optimal action at every type εi to increase, since Πi has the SID property.
In other words, player i’s optimal strategy σi also increases pointwise. Thus the strategies of the
players are strategic complements and the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibium is guaranteed
(Vives, 1990).
5.2 Rationalization
Definition 7. P  tPp|xt,AtqutPT is rationalizable as a BNE if, for each player i, there is a set
of types Ei, distributions Fip, x˜tiq on Ei, and payoff functions Πip, εiq : Yi  Bi  Xi Ñ R (for each
type εi P Ei) such that in each game environment pxt,Atq, there is a BNE pσˆtiqiPN that leads to
Pp|xt,Atq as the distribution on the action profiles At.
Our objective is to characterize those data sets which are rationalizable as BNE with payoff
functions obeying SID. As an example of what we have in mind, suppose that the players in the
game are radio stations, whose strategy consists of choosing the time during a particular hour at
which to have a commercial break (as in Sweeting (2009)). For a given station, the optimal timing
of a break depends on observable factors, such as the choices made by rival radio stations, but also
on idiosyncratic causes unobserved by other stations; for example, on any particular day, a station
must fit its commercial breaks around other pieces of programming. For this reason, we may think
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of radio stations as playing a game of incomplete information. Each observation t corresponds to
a radio market (corresponding to particular geographically area), with Pp|xt,Atq being the joint
distribution of commercial break times (at different stations) observed in that market.
Note that, in practice, obtaining the distribution Pp|xt,Atq could involve sampling the outcomes
of the same game played many times. Our definition of rationalizability implicitly posits that the
data collected to obtain Pp|xt,Atq are realizations from the same BNE; consequently, this feature
is also part of the test we formulate. The estimation literature has addressed this issue in different
ways. There are models where the primitives are such that multiplicity is excluded (for example,
Seim (2006)), so the danger of sampling from different BNE of the same game does not arise; in other
cases, such as Sweeting (2009), the estimation strategy assumes that a single equilibrium is played
at each market, even if it allows for the possibility that different equilibria are played at different
markets which have the same observable characteristics (and so players are playing the same game).
Indeed, Sweeting (2009) emphasizes the usefulness for estimation of multiple equilibria. In terms of
our notation, Sweeting (2009) allows for the possibility that Pp|xt,Atq  Pp|xs,Asq, even though
pxt,Atq  pxs,Asq. Our definition and test of rationalizability allows for this possibility as well.
It may be implausible in certain applications to assume that the realized actions observed are
from a single BNE. This corresponds, in our setup, to the case where the distribution Pp|xt,Atq is
obtained from a mixture of several BNE of the same game. Our rationalization concept does not
allow for that possibility, and we do not formulate a test for this case. Note that a distribution ob-
tained from such a mixture is precisely what is considered in De Paula and Tang (2012).19 However,
their objective is not to rationalize a data set as BNE with SID preferences, but rather to determine
the direction of interaction effects under the assumption that BNE are played; interestingly, the
efficacy of their test hinges on the presence of multiple BNE.
5.3 BNE rationalizability with SID payoff functions
Let us suppose that P is rationalizable as a BNE. Then given our assumption that players’ types
are independent from each other, the distribution of players’ actions must also be independent.
19See also the extension of Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi (2016).
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Consequently, for any y1 P Y and at any observation t,
Ppy1|xt,Atq  Ni1Pipy1i|xt,Atq,
where Pipy1i|xt,Atq 
°
yiPYi
Ppy1i,yi|xt,Atq is the probability of the agent i choosing action y1i.
Notice also that, given the form of agent i’s payoff function, the actions of other players only
affect player i’s payoff via the average value of gi. The independence property guarantees that this
value is independent of the realization of εi and given by
bti  EFipgipσˆtiq|xtiq 
¸
yiPYi
gipyi, xtq  Pipyi|xt,Atq (15)
where Pipyi|xt,Atq  jiPjpyj|xt,Atq is the observed probability of yi at observation t. It
follows from (15) that bti is known to the econometrician. Somewhat abusing our notation, we shall
now write Pipy1i|xt,Atq, player i’s observed probability of choosing action y1i, as Pipy1i|bti, xti, Atiq, in
order to highlight precisely those factors which have an impact on the player’s action.
To rationalize P it is necessary and sufficient to rationalize the actions of each i, given the
player’s choice environment, as summarized by pbti, xtiq. In other words, we need to rationalize
Pi  tPip|bti, xti, Atiq : t P T u (16)
in the sense of finding Ei, distributions Fip, x˜tiq on Ei, payoff functions Πip, εiq : Yi  Bi  Xi Ñ R
(for each type εi P Ei), and strategies σˆti : Ei Ñ Ati at each observation t such that
(i) Πipσˆtipεiq, bti, xti, εiq ¥ Πipyi, bti, xti, εiq for all yi P Ati and εi in the support of Fip, x˜tiq;
(ii) Pipyi|bti, xti, Atiq 
³
Ei 1pσˆtq1i pyiqdFipεi, x˜tiq, where pσˆtq
1
i pyiq  tεi P Ei : σˆtipεiq  yiu.
Condition (i) states that σˆti is an optimal response while (ii) guarantees that it generates a distri-
bution over actions coinciding with the one observed.
Notice that the problem of rationalizing Pi with SID payoff functions is virtually identical to the
one discussed in Section 3.3 and solved in Theorem 3, with the exception that while the distribution
of types in that case is held fixed across all observations, we allow it to vary with x˜i in this case.
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Since we can always choose the support of Fip, x˜tiq and Fip, x˜si q to be non-overlapping whenever
x˜ti  x˜si , there are effectively no restrictions imposed by the rationalizability of Pi on Pip|bti, xti, Atiq
and Pip|bsi , xsi , Asi q jointly when x˜ti and x˜si are distinct. However, restrictions of the type imposed
by Theorem 3 must hold (and are also sufficient) whenever x˜ti  x˜si since the rationalizability of Pi
requires the distribution of types to be the same in these two case. To state this more formally, we
partition T into Ti1, Ti2,..., Tinpiq, separating observations which have distinct x˜i. (Thus, for any
two observations t and s in Tik, we have x˜ti  x˜si .) Let
Pik  tPip|bti, xti, Atiq : t P Tiku (17)
for each i and k  1, 2, . . . , npiq. The following result summarizes our observations.
Theorem 7. P  tPp|xt,AtqutPT is rationalizable as a BNE with independent types and pay-
off functions of the form (13) obeying SID in pyi; bi, x¯iq if and only if, for each i P N and k 
1, 2, . . . , npiq, the set Pik (as defined by (17)) passes the test specified in Theorem 3.
There are a number of features of this result that are worth remarking on. Firstly, suppose Xi 
X¯i, which means that we require the distribution of εi to be completely independent of i’s observable
characteristics. In that case, there is no nontrivial partition of Pi, and so the rationalizability
condition in Theorem 7 is simply that Pi (as defined by (16)) passes the test specified in Theorem
3 (for each player i).
On the other hand, if we wish to allow the type distribution to be partially dependent on
observable characteristics, then there will typically be a nontrivial partition of Pi. But notice that
for the test specified in Theorem 7 to be non-vacuous, it is crucial that there is some Pik containing
more than one element. In other words, there must be observations t and s where x˜ti  x˜si , even as
other aspects of the game environment differ between these observations. This can be thought of
as a version of the familiar exclusion assumptions found extensively in the estimation literature.
Since the rationalizability of P imposes no relationship between Fip, x˜tiq and Fip, x˜si q whenever
x˜ti  x˜si , it is always possible to choose their supports to be completely non-overlapping. Essentially
because of this, whenever Πi can be chosen to obey SID in pyi; pbi, x¯iqq then it can be chosen to obey
SID in pyi; pbi, x˜i, x¯iqq; in other words, the latter (seemingly stronger) condition in fact imposes no
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further restrictions on the data. We leave the reader to fill in the details.
Lastly, in the case where the constraint sets for each player do not vary across observations,
there is a simple characterization of rationalizability in terms of first order stochastic dominance
(FSD). This follows immediately from Theorem 4.
Theorem 8. Suppose that P  tPp|xt,AtqutPT satisfies At  ni1Ai for all t. Then P is ratio-
nalizable as a BNE with independent types and payoff functions of the form (13) obeying SID in
pyi; bi, x¯iq if and only if, for each i P N and s, t P Tik,
pbti, x¯tiq ¡ pbsi , x¯si q ùñ Pip|bti, x¯ti, Aiq ¥FSD Pip|bsi , x¯si , Aiq. (18)
Example 4. Suppose we have at least two observations of a two player game where gipyjq  yj
for i  j. Each observation consists of a distribution of actions for player 1 and a distribution of
actions for player 2. We assume that there are no changes either in the exogenous variables or in
the constraint sets; in other words, this is the case emphasized by Sweeting (2009), of potentially
distinct BNE of the same game. Suppose that b22 ¡ b12; in other words, player 2’s average action is
higher in observation 2 than in observation 1. For P to be rationalizable, condition (18) requires the
distribution of player 1’s action in the second observation to first order stochastically dominate the
distribution at the first observation. In particular, player 1’s action has a higher mean in the second
observation compared to the first, which in turn requires (via (18) again) that the distribution
of player 2’s action in the second observation should first order stochastically dominate that in
the first. To sum up, for each player, the distribution of actions must be comparable across any
two observations (with respect to FSD) and they must be co-monotone across players. When this
occurs, the observations can be rationalized as distinct BNE of the same game, with each player i
obeying SID in pyi; biq.
5.4 Variations on Theorem 7
In Theorem 7, the payoff function of player i is required to obey SID in pyi; bi, x¯iq. It may be the
case that the econometrician is interested in a weaker criterion: that payoff functions obey SID
in pyi; biq. In other words, the focus is on restricting interaction effects between players, while the
effect of the exogenous variable xi on i’s payoff is allowed to be arbitrary. It is straightforward to
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check that this case can be covered by an analogous version of Theorem 7 in which Pi is partitioned
differently: two observations s and t in the same partitioned subset Pik must satisfy xsi  xti.20
So far in this section we have assumed that we can identify a player in role i across observations
and that his payoff function could differ from another player in role j. We could require instead
that all players are ex ante identical, in the sense of having the same payoff function Πpyi, bi, xi, εiq,
though players in a given game could still be different since they may be associated with different
observable characteristics. For the sake of simplicity, suppose also that the private type of each
player is independently and identically distributed across players and completely independent of
each player’s observable characteristic. In this case, it is straightforward to check that the following
modified version of Theorem 7 holds: P is rationalizable as a BNE with independent types and
some payoff function Π obeying SID in pyi; pbi, x¯iqq if and only if
n
i1Pi passes the test specified
in Theorem 3. In other words, instead of testing each Pi separately (as in Theorem 7) they must
now be tested jointly. Lastly, note that we could pursue this logic further by allowing the number
of (ex ante identical) players at each observed game to vary. For each player at each observation,
the observable characteristics, the interaction term, the constraint set, and the distribution over the
player’s actions are known. BNE-rationalizability with a single payoff function obeying SID could
be checked by subjecting all of these distributions (as a single collection) to the test specified in
Theorem 3.
6 Empirical Illustration: rationalizing an entry game
We implement the results of Section 4 to study a complete information entry game. Our data set is
taken from Kline and Tamer (2016), who use it to illustrate the application of their new econometric
techniques. The data set they construct contains the entry decisions of airlines in 7882 markets,
where a market is defined as a trip between two airports irrespective of intermediate stops. Airline
firms are divided into two categories: LCC (low cost carriers) and OA (other airlines).21 In Kline
and Tamer’s analysis (and in ours) the two categories are treated as two firms; thus in each market,
20Another way of saying the same thing is that X¯i no longer exists, and Xi  rXi.
21The data were collected from the second quarter of the 2010 Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B).
The low cost carriers are AirTran, Allegiant Air, Frontier, JetBlue, Midwest Air, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Country,
USA3000, and Virgin America. A firm that is not an LCC is by definition an OA.
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Covariates = p0, 0, 0q 1271 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
30.37% 68.21% 0.55% 0.87%
Covariates = p0, 1, 0q 763 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
19% 78.51% 0.26% 2.23%
Covariates = p1, 0, 0q 1125 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
19.38% 36.71% 25.33% 18.58%
Covariates = p1, 1, 0q 782 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
12.15% 54.22% 4.99% 28.64%
Covariates = p0, 0, 1q 869 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
15.88% 82.28% 0.12% 1.73%
Covariates = p0, 1, 1q 1039 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
7.80% 88.93% 0% 3.27%
Covariates = p1, 0, 1q 677 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
10.64% 32.64% 30.58% 26.14%
Covariates = p1, 1, 1q 1356 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
5.53% 50.07% 2.14% 42.26%
Table 4: Distribution of action profiles across exogenous variables
the two players (LCC and OA) can either both enter, both stay out, or one could enter with the
other staying out.
This data set also contains information on two explanatory variables: market presence (P ) and
market size (S). Market presence is a market- and airline-specific variable. For each airline and
for each airport, they count the number of markets that airline serves from that airport and divide
it by the total number of markets served from that airport by any airline. The market presence
variable for a given market and airline is the average of these ratios at the two endpoints of the trip.
The construction and inclusion of this explanatory variable is not novel and follows Berry (1992).
Since the airlines are aggregated into two firms (LCC and OA), the market presence variable is also
aggregated: the market presence for the LCC firm (resp. OA firm) is the maximum among the
actual airlines in the LCC category (resp. OA category). The second explanatory variable is market
size, which is a market-specific variable (shared by all airlines in that market) and is defined as the
population at the endpoints of the trip. Lastly, Kline and Tamer (2016) discretize the market size
and market presence variables to take two values: 1 if the variable is higher than its median value
and 0 otherwise.
This data set is presented in Table 4. It consists of eight blocks, with the markets in each block
sharing the same exogenous variables. For example, there are 1271 markets where pPLCC , POA, Sq 
p0, 0, 0q, of which 30.37% are not served by either airline and 0.87% are served by both.
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pεLCC , εOAq
Firm OA
N E
Firm LCC
N 0 0 0 ΠOApN,E, POA, S, εOAq
E ΠLCCpE,N,PLCC , S, εLCCq 0 ΠLCCpE,E, PLCC , S, εLCCq ΠOApE,E, POA, S, εOAq
Table 5: Payoff matrix in market pεLCC , εOA)
6.1 Testing Rationalizability
Notice that the entries in Table 4 are mostly ‘reasonable’, in the sense that it appears as though
a firm’s entry is encouraged whenever its market presence is large or the market is large, and it is
deterred by the entry of the other firm. For example, going from p0, 0, 0q to p1, 0, 0q (so the market
presence of LCC has increased), both PpN,Nq and PpN,Eq fall, while PpE,Nq and PpE,Eq both
increase. Our results in Section 4 allow us to formulate and test this claim rigorously.
First, the notion of ‘reasonable’ behavior can be formalized by requiring LCC and OA to have
payoff functions with the SID property. Specifically, let εLCC be a type of the LCC player and denote
its payoff function by ΠLCCpyLCC , yOA, PLCC , S, εLCCq, where yLCC is the choice variable (either E
or N) and pyOA, PLCC , Sq are the other variables that affect its payoff. We require ΠLCCp, εLCCq to
obey SID in pyLCC ; pyOA, PLCC , Sqq; in other words, if LCC prefers to enter a market when OA has
entered, its market presence is small, or the market size is small, then (respectively) it will also enter
if OA has not entered, its market presence is large, or when the market is large.22 LCC’s payoff if it
stays out of a market is normalized at 0. Similarly, we require ΠOApyLCC , yOA, PLCC , S, εOAq to obey
SID in pyOA; pyLCC , POA, Sqq. At a typical market, the econometrician observes pPLCC , POA, Sq
but not pεLCC , εOAq; the two players are playing a game of complete information so they observe
everything. Table 5 depicts the game played at a typical market between the two firms. The issue
we wish to address is whether the data displayed in Table 4 is rationalizable as PSNE (in the
stochastic sense defined in Definition 6), with both firms having payoff functions obeying SID.
At this point, it may be helpful to mention two features of our rationalizability criterion.
[1] To reiterate what we have stated more generally in Section 4, our notion of rationalizability is
silent regarding the joint distribution of types pεLCC , εOAq and it also imposes no restriction on
the equilibrium selection rule. In particular, we allow any sort of correlation between εLCC and
22For the SID property, we treat E as ranked above N (associated with values 1 and 0 respectively).
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εOA and the equilibrium selection rule may depend on particular realizations of pεLCC , εOAq.
We do assume (as does Kline and Tamer (2016)) that the joint distribution of pεLCC , εOAq is
independent of the exogenous variables pPLCC , POA, Sq.
[2] Since only a firm’s preference is recovered when a data set is rationalizable, we are free to
choose the payoff function so long as it generates the same preference. It is easy to check that
any payoff function for (say) LCC that obeys SID (which is an ordinal property) is ordinally
equivalent to some (other) payoff function ΠLCC where ΠLCCpN, yOA, PLCC , S, εLCCq  0 and
ΠLCCpE, yOA, PLCC , S, εLCCq is increasing in pyOA, PLCC , Sq. In other words, whenever a
data set is stochastically rationalizable, with firms having payoff functions that obey SID,
then we can always choose the payoff functions so that the payoff of entering increases when
the other firm stays out, the market presence is high, and the market size is big, and the
payoff of staying out is normalized at 0.23
By Theorem 6, the rationalizability test involves working out all the paths that obey the SRM
axiom and then finding weights on them that are consistent with the distribution over joint actions
observed at each value of the exogenous variables.24 In this data set, there are 48  65, 536
possible group paths, since for each of the eight possible covariate values, there are four joint
choices that a pair of firms can make. The set of paths that obey the SRM axiom, Y, contains
482 paths. A path y  pyp0,0,0q,yp0,1,0q, . . .q specifies the joint action at each value of the exogenous
variables. For example the following path obeys the SRM axiom: yp0,0,0q  pN,Nq, yp0,1,0q  pN,Eq,
yp1,0,0q  pE,Nq, yp1,1,0q  pN,Eq, yp0,0,1q  pN,Eq, yp1,0,1q  pE,Eq, yp0,1,1q  pN,Eq, and
yp1,1,1q  pE,Eq. Indeed, this is the path of PSNE that arises if the firms have the following SID
preferences: LCC prefers entering if and only if (i) its market presence is large and the other firm
is absent or (ii) its market presence is large and the market size is large; OA prefers entering if and
only if (i) its market presence is large or (ii) the market size is large.
Suppose for now that the entries in Table 4 give the true distribution at each value of the
exogenous variables/covariates. In that case, we can implement the test in Theorem 6 directly
by checking whether there is a solution to the linear system (11). It turns out that there is no
23Note that this hinges on there being just two actions for each firm.
24We focus on preferences where a firm is never indifferent between entering and staying out. It follows that the
paths must obey the SRM axiom rather than the RM axiom (see remarks following Theorem 6).
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Covariates = p0, 0, 0q 1271 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
30.06% 67.90% 0.86% 1.18%
Covariates = p0, 1, 0q 763 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
18.29% 78.96% 0.71% 2.05%
Covariates = p1, 0, 0q 1125 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
19.38% 36.71% 25.33% 18.58%
Covariates = p1, 1, 0q 782 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
12.73% 53.64% 5.57% 28.06%
Covariates = p0, 0, 1q 869 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
15.46% 81.86% 0.54% 2.15%
Covariates = p0, 1, 1q 1039 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
7.86% 89.19% 0.26% 2.69%
Covariates = p1, 0, 1q 677 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
10.64% 32.64% 30.58% 26.14%
Covariates = p1, 1, 1q 1356 markets
PpN,Nq PpN,Eq PpE,Nq PpE,Eq
5.63% 49.98% 2.24% 42.16%
Table 6: Rationalizable outcome closest to Table 4
solution, so this data set is not exactly rationalizable. This is fairly surprising, since the number
of unknowns (482) far exceeds the number of linear constraints, which suggests that the conditions
are very permissive. In fact, there is at least one easy-to-understand reason why the dataset is
not rationalizable. Notice from the data that PpN,N |1, 1, 0q  PpE,N |1, 1, 0q  17.14%   19% 
PpN,N |0, 1, 0q. This is not compatible with rationalizability for the following reason: any pair of
firms with SID preferences that select pN,Nq at p0, 1, 0q would either select pN,Nq or pE,Nq at
p1, 1, 0q.
If we solve for the dataset that is rationalizable and closest (as measured by the sum of square
deviations) to the one we actually observe, we get the distribution displayed in Table 6. Notice that
in this case PpN,N |1, 1, 0q  PpE,N |1, 1, 0q  18.3% ¡ 18.29%  PpN,N |0, 1, 0q. If we compare
the entries in Tables 4 and 6, we see immediately that they look quite close, which naturally makes
us wonder whether the observed violation of rationalizability is in fact significant.
To address this issue, we adopt the approach recently proposed by Kitamura and Stoye (2016);
they develop a method of evaluating the statistical significance of a data set violating a set of linear
constraints that directly applies to our framework.25 Roughly speaking, the test assumes that
the closest compatible distribution displayed in the last table is the true distribution, and uses a
bootstrap procedure to calculate the likelihood of getting a sample like the one we observe. (See the
Online Appendix for a fuller description of the Kitamura-Stoye procedure and our implementation
25Kitamura and Stoye (2016) apply their test to the consumer utility-maximization problem.
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Set Description # of paths Est. Prob. Conf. Int.
Non-strategic LCC (YLCC) 69 r71, 88s r65, 92s
Non-strategic OA (YOA) 69 r59, 75s r55, 78s
Non-strategic LCC and OA (YLCC X Y

OA) 36 r48, 75s r44, 78s
Table 7: Incidence of non-strategic payoffs
of all these results.) By applying their test, we find that the probability of getting our sample (or
a more extreme one), assuming that our modelling restrictions are true, is 15% without a tuning
parameter and it decreases as the value of the tuning parameter gets larger.26 These probabilities
correspond to the p-values for the null hypothesis that our modelling assumptions are true and they
indicate that our hypothesis cannot be rejected for small values of the tuning parameter.27
6.2 Estimation
In testing the model, we also recover information on the distribution of paths, and thus on the
distribution of firms’ preferences, that could have generated the data. This information allows us
to investigate a variety of interesting issues. To illustrate how this can be carried out, we ask the
following basic question: are strategic effects necessary to explain the data, and if so, in what way?
For LCCs, their choice of action is affected by the exogenous variables pPLCC , Sq, which can take
four possible values, in addition to the action of the other carrier. We say that an LCC’s preference
at some fixed pPLCC , Sq is non-strategic if its optimal action is independent of the other player’s
action, i.e., the sign of ΠLCCpE, yOA, PLCC , S, εLCCq is independent of yOA; on the other hand, its
preference is strategic if the payoff switches from being positive to negative if the other player enters.
Therefore, if LCC is non-strategic in a given market, then either E or N is a dominant strategy,
while a strategic LCC chooses E if and only if the other firm stays out.
We identify, among the 482 paths that obey the SRM axiom, those paths which can be ratio-
26The Kitamura-Stoye test relies on a tuning parameter that solves a discontinuity issue arising from the possibility
of boundary solutions. From an economic perspective, the tuning parameter modifies the initial hypothesis by forcing
all consistent types to have a strictly positive probability in the linear model. The p-value estimates are sensitive to
the tuning parameter.
27A more permissive version of our rationalizability test would allow for the possibility that firms may be indifferent
between entering and not entering a market (see footnote 24). In that case, the rationalizability test involves solving
(11), with the paths obeying the RM axiom (rather than the SRM axiom); there are 1,809 paths with this weaker
property. The p-value increases to 36% without a tuning parameter (see the Online Appendix).
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nalized by LCC preferences that are always non-strategic, in the sense that the carrier’s preference
is non-strategic at every realization of pPLCC , Sq. (Note that LCC’s decision can still depend on
pPLCC , Sq). Let us denote this set of paths by YLCC . It is worth bearing in mind that since ra-
tionalizing preferences are non-unique, there is a difference between YLCC and paths that must
be rationalized by non-strategic LCC preferences, which will be a subset of YLCC .
28 Since we are
investigating whether strategic behavior is necessary for explaining the data, we focus our attention
on YLCC . Similarly, we can identify Y

OA, those paths with the feature that it can be rationalized
by OA being always non-strategic.
It turns out that there are 69 paths each in YLCC and in Y

OA. (The path example given in
the previous subsection is a member of YOA but not of Y

LCC .
29) The interval under ‘Estimated
Probability’ in Table 7 gives the interval estimate on the probability of YLCC , subject to the model
generating the closest rationalizable distribution (i.e., the one depicted in Table 6).30 The last
column gives the confidence intervals on the probability of YLCC ; in essence, it gives the values on
the probability of YLCC which, when imposed as an additional restriction on the model, would still
allow the model to approximately rationalize the data (in Table 4) at the 5% level of significance;31
this interval must, by construction contain the estimated probability. The first thing to notice is
that the confidence interval on YLCC has an upper bound that is clearly below 1; to be specific,
it is 0.92. This means that, notwithstanding the greater flexibility of our nonparametric model, a
more parsimonious version of the model in which LCC is assumed to be always non-strategic will
not be able to explain the data. Indeed, the probability of LCC being strategic (for some value of
pPLCC , Sq) must be at least 0.08.32 Formally, we may conclude that
P ptεLCC : ΠLCCp, PLCC , S, εLCCq is strategic at some pPLCC , Squq ¥ 0.08.
28For example, consider a path where OA always chooses N and LCC always chooses E. This path obeys the
SRM axiom and is in YLCC since it can be rationalized by a preference where LCC always prefers to enter, but it
is clear that there also exists a rationalization with a strategic LCC.
29The reader can check that there is no non-strategic LCC preference that rationalizes the path.
30This calculation is described at the start of Section 4.3.
31The procedure for calculating these intervals follow Deb, Kitamura, Quah, and Stoye (2018) and is explained
more carefully in the Online Appendix.
32YLCC is the set of path that can be (not must be) rationalized by non-strategic LCC preferences. This means
that the upper bound of the confidence interval on YLCC really is the upper bound on the probability of non-strategic
LCCs, but the lower bound of that interval could be an overestimate of non-strategic behavior, because there are
some paths in YLCC which can also be rationalized by strategic LCCs.
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Set Description (subsets of Yˆ) # of paths Est. Prob. Conf. Int.
Non-strategic LCC for all pPLCC , Sq 46 r71, 88s r65, 92s
Strategic LCC at pPLCC , Sq  p1, 1q or p1, 0q 22 r11, 28s r8, 34s
Strategic LCC at pPLCC , Sq  p1, 1q 13 r11, 28s r8, 33s
of which Strategic LCC at pPLCC , Sq  p1, 0q 17 r9, 16s r6, 19s
Strategic LCC at pPLCC , Sq  p1, 1q & p1, 0q 8 [0,16] r0, 19s
Non-strategic OA for all pPOA, Sq 46 r59, 75s r55, 78s
Strategic OA at pPOA, Sq  p0, 1q or p0, 0q 22 r24, 40s r21, 45s
Strategic OA at pPOA, Sq  p0, 1q 17 r24, 26s r21, 29s
of which Strategic OA at pPOA, Sq  p0, 0q 13 r13, 40s r10, 45s
Strategic OA at pPOA, Sq  p0, 1q & p0, 0q 8 r10, 26s r6, 29s
Table 8: Composition of data-rationalizing types
Analogously, we surmise from Table 7 that for OA
P ptεOA : ΠOAp, POA, S, εOAq is strategic at some pPOA, Squq ¥ 0.22.
It is worthwhile finding out precisely where is strategic behavior crucial in explaining the data.
Indeed, we discover that it is possible to restrict ourselves to paths in the set Yˆ, which consists
of paths where the preference of LCC can be chosen to be non-strategic whenever PLCC  0 (i.e.,
at pPLCC , Sq  p0, 0q and at pPLCC , Sq  p0, 1q) and the preference of OA can be chosen to be
non-strategic whenever POA  1 (i.e., at pPOA, Sq  p1, 0q and at pPOA, Sq  p1, 1q).33 There are
68 paths in Yˆ, its estimated probability is 0.99, and the confidence interval is [0.96,1]. In other
words, if we have a more restrictive model in which we require LCC to be non-strategic at PLCC  0
and OA to be non-strategic at POA  1, such a model will still be consistent with the data.
Combining these observations, we conclude that to explain the data, it is crucial that there are
markets where (I) LCCs are strategic when PLCC  1 and (II) OAs are strategic when POA  0.
This phenomenon is recorded in Table 8 which gives a dissection of the types that explain the data.
All the paths reported in this table are drawn from Yˆ. The first row gives the weight on the set
of paths where LCC’s preference can be chosen to be always non-strategic (i.e., at all four possible
33It is important to note that flipping the restrictions will not work. Indeed, the estimated weight of those paths
which are rationalizable with LCC being non-strategic at pPLCC , Sq  p1, 1q is 0.88 while the estimated weight of
those paths which are rationalizable with OA being non-strategic at pPOA, Sq  p0, 0q is 0.86, so both numbers are
some distance away from 1.
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values of pPLCC , Sq); there are 46 paths in this group and its weight is significantly less than 1.
Explaining the data therefore requires the remaining paths in Yˆ, which are those where LCC
must be strategic, in the sense that any rationalization of the path will involve LCC being strategic
at either pPLCC , Sq  p1, 0q or at pPLCC , Sq  p1, 1q (and possibly both); there are 22 paths in this
group. We can explore its composition further and estimate the probability of those paths where
LCC has to be strategic at (1,0), at (1,1), and at both (1,0) and (1,1). We learn, for example, that
PptεLCC : ΠLCCp, PLCC , S, εLCCq is strategic at pPLCC , Sq  p1, 1quq ¥ 0.08.34
In other words, the probability that LCC is strategic in a market with observable characteristic
pPLCC , Sq  p1, 1q is at least 0.08. Similarly, for OA, we find that
PptεOA : ΠOAp, POA, S, εOAq is strategic at pPOA, Sq  p0, 1quq ¥ 0.21.
Appendix I
Proof of Theorem 1
It suffices to show that (b) implies (c): if O obeys RM axiom, then it is rationalizable by a pref-
erence that obeys SSCD. Our proof involves first working out the (incomplete) revealed preference
relations on Y Z that must be satisfied by any SID preference that rationalizes the data and then
constructing a rationalizing preference on Y  Z that completes those relations and obeys SSCD.
Given a data set O  tpyt, zt, AtqutPT , the single-crossing extension of the indirect revealed
preference relation ÁRT is another binary relation ¡RTS defined in the following way: (i) for y2 ¡ y1,
py2, zq ¡RTS py1, zq if there is z1   z such that py2, z1q ¡RT py1, z1q and (ii) for y2   y1, py2, zq ¡RTS
py1, zq if there is z2 ¡ z such that py2, z2q ÁRT py1, z2q. Let ÁRTS be the relation given by ÁRTS
¡RTS Y ÁRT . It follows immediately from its definition that ÁRTS also obeys SSCD, in the following
34Note that the upper bound on that confidence interval, 0.33, is not a cap on the probability that LCC is strategic
at p1, 0q because paths could be rationalized in more than one way, and there are paths that could be rationalized
by one LCC preference that is strategic at (1,0) and another that is not. See the related observation in Footnote 32.
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sense: if y2 ¡ y1 and z2 ¡ z1 or y2   y1 and z2   z1, then
py2, z1q ÁRTS py1, z1q ùñ py2, z2q ¡RTS py1, z2q. (19)
In addition, let ÁRTST be the transitive closure of ÁRTS, i.e., py2, zq ÁRTST py1, zq if there is a
sequence y¯1, y¯2, ..., y¯k
35 such that
py2, zq ÁRTS py¯1, zq ÁRTS    ÁRTS py¯k, zq ÁRTS py1, zq. (20)
If there is one strict relation ¡RTS in this sequence, then we say that py2, zq ¡RTST py1, zq.36
Lemma A1: The relations ÁRTS, ¡RTS, and ÁRTST have the interval property.
Proof. Let y2 ¡ y ¡ y1. (The case where y2   y   y1 can be proved in a similar way.) If
py2, zq ÁRTS p¡RTSq py1, zq holds, there exists some z1 ¤ p q z such that py2, z1q ÁRT py1, z1q. By
the interval property of ÁRT (see the proof of Proposition 1), we obtain py2, z1q ÁRT py, z1q. Since
y2 ¡ y and z1 ¤ p q z, we have py2, zq ÁRTS p¡RTSq py, zq. So we have shown that ÁRTS and ¡RTS
have the interval property. Lastly, if py2, zq ÁRTST py1, zq, there exists a sequence y¯1, y¯2, ..., y¯k such
that
py2, zq ÁRTS py¯1, zq ÁRTS py¯2, zq ÁRTS ... ÁRTS py¯k, zq ÁRTS py1, zq.
Letting y¯0  y2 and y¯k 1  y1, since y2 ¡ y ¡ y1, we can find some 0 ¤ m ¤ k such that y¯m ¥ y ¥
y¯m 1. By the interval property of Á
RTS, we obtain py¯m, zq ÁRTS py, zq. Thus py2, zq ÁRTST py, zq
since py2, zq ÁRTST py¯m, zq ÁRTS py, zq. QED
The relevance of the binary relations ÁRTST and ¡RTST flows from the following lemma, which
says that any rationalizing preference for the agent must respect the ranking implied by them.
Lemma A2:37 Suppose that the preference obeys SID and rationalizes O. Then Á extends ÁRTST
35Note that subscripts here denote generic numbering. When we wish to refer to an action at a particular
observation t, we write yt.
36Note that ¡RTS is not the asymmetric part of ÁRTS and ¡RTST is not the asymmetric part of ÁRTST .
37Strictly speaking this result is not needed for the proof of Theorem 1, but it provides the motivation for why
we are focusing on ÁRTST and ¡RTST .
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and ¡RTST in the following sense:
py2, zq ÁRTST p¡RTST q py1, zq ùñ py2, zq Á p¡q py1, zq. (21)
Proof. We assume y2 ¡ y1. (The other case has a similar proof.) Since Á is transitive, we need only
show that py2, zq Á p¡q py1, zq whenever py2, zq ÁRTS p¡RTSq py1, zq. If py2, zq ÁRTS p¡RTSq py1, zq
then there exists some z1 ¤ p q z such that py2, z1q ÁRT py1, z1q. By the interval property of ÁRT , we
obtain py2, z1q ÁRT py, z1q for all y P ry1, y2s. Since Á rationalizes O, we also have py2, z1q Á py, z1q
for all y P ry1, y2s. By SID of Á, we obtain py2, zq Á p¡q py1, zq for z1 ¤ p q z. QED
The next result establishes a property of ÁRTST useful for the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma A3: Suppose py2, zq ÁRTST py1, zq; then there is a sequence ty¯jukj1 such that
py2, zq ÁRTS py¯1, zq ÁRTS py¯2, zq ÁRTS    ÁRTS py¯k, zq ÁRTS py1, zq, (22)
with y2 ¡ y¯1 ¡ y¯2 ¡    ¡ y¯k ¡ y1, (23)
if y2 ¡ y1 and the inequality (23) reversed if y2   y1.
Proof. By the definition of ÁRTST , we know there is ty¯jukj1 such that (22) holds, so what we need
to do is to show that ty¯jukj1 obeys (23) if y2 ¡ y1. (The case where y2   y1 has an analogous proof
which we shall skip.) To do this, we choose a chain linking py2, zq and py1, zq with the property that
(writing y¯0  y2 and y¯k 1  y1) py¯m, zq ÃRTS py¯m1 , zq for m1 ¡ m  1; in other words, no link in the
chain can be dropped. We claim that (23) must hold in this case. First we note that y¯j ¡ y1 for all
j   k  1. If not, there is ` such that y¯` ¤ y1   y¯`1, with py¯`1, zq ÁRTS py¯`, zq; since ÁRTS has the
interval property (Lemma A1), we obtain py¯`1, zq ÁRTS py1, zq and the chain has been shortened.
To show that y¯j is decreasing, suppose instead that there is m such that y¯m 1 ¡ y¯m. Let y¯m n be
the first time after y¯m 1 such that y¯m n ¤ y¯m. (This must occur since y¯m ¡ y1.) Then we have
y¯m n ¤ y¯m   y¯m n1. Since py¯m n1, zq ÁRTS py¯m n, zq, the interval property of ÁRTS guarantees
that py¯m n1, zq ÁRTS py¯m, zq. Thus we obtain a cycle
py¯m, zq ÁRTS py¯m 1, zq ÁRTS ... ÁRTS py¯m n1, zq ÁRTS py¯m, zq.
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Since ÁRTS is cyclically consistent, this chain cannot be related by ¡RTS and must be related by
ÁRT . In particular, py¯m n1, zq £RTS py¯m, zq and thus py¯m n1, zq £RTS py¯m n, zq (by the interval
property of ¡RTS). We conclude that py¯m, zq ÁRT py¯m n, zq and thus we can shorten (22) to
py2, zq ÁRTS py¯1, zq ÁRTS ... ÁRTS py¯m, zq ÁRTS py¯m n, zq ÁRTS ... ÁRTS py¯k, zq ÁRTS py1, zq
which contradicts our assumption that no link in the chain can be dropped. QED
It follows from Lemma A2 that in order for O to be monotone rationalizable, the binary relation
ÁRTST must have the following property: for any py1, zq and py2, zq in Y  Z,
py1, zq ÁRTST py2, zq ùñ py2, zq £RTST py1, zq. (24)
If not, we obtain both py1, zq Á py2, zq and py2, zq ¡ py1, zq, which is impossible. The following
lemma says that ÁRTST obeys this property as well as SSCD whenever O obeys RM axiom.
Lemma A4: Suppose that O obeys RM axiom. Then, ÁRTST obeys SSCD and property (24).
Proof. We first prove that (24) holds. The statement (24) is equivalent to ÁRTS being cyclically
consistent, i.e.,
py¯1, zq ÁRTS py¯2, zq ÁRTS ... ÁRTS py¯k, zq ùñ py¯k, zq £RTS py¯1, zq. (25)
Cyclical consistency can in turn be equivalently re-formulated as the following:
py¯1, zq ÁRTS py¯2, zq ÁRTS ... ÁRTS py¯k, zq ÁRTS py¯1, zq (26)
ùñ py¯1, zq £RTS py¯2, zq £RTS ... £RTS py¯k, zq £RTS py¯1, zq
Thus, whenever there is a cycle like (26), it must be the case that
py¯1, zq ÁRT py¯2, zq ÁRT ... ÁRT py¯k, zq ÁRT py¯1, zq
We prove (24) by induction on the length of the chain, k, on the left side of (25). Whenever
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(25) holds for chains of length k or less (equivalently, whenever the cycles in (26) have length k or
less), we say that ÁRTS is k-consistent. For 2-consistency, we need to show that
py¯1, zq ÁRTS py¯2, zq ùñ py¯2, zq £RTS py¯1, zq.
Suppose that y¯1 ¡ y¯2; the case of y¯1   y¯2 can be dealt with in a similar way. By definition, if
py¯1, zq ÁRTS py¯2, zq then there is z1 ¤ z such that py¯1, z1q ÁRT py¯2, z1q. On the other hand, if
py¯2, zq ¡RTS py¯1, zq, then there is z2 ¡ z such that py¯2, z2q ÁRT py¯1, z2q and so we obtain a violation
of RM axiom. Suppose that ÁRTS is k-consistent for all k   k¯. To show that k¯-consistency
holds, suppose the left side of (25) holds for k  k¯ and y¯1   y¯k¯. Clearly, there must be m   k¯
such that y¯m   y¯k¯ and y¯m 1 ¥ y¯k¯. We consider two cases: (A) y¯m ¥ y¯1 and (B) y¯m   y¯1.
In case (A), by the interval property of ÁRTS (Lemma A1), we obtain py¯m, zq ÁRTS py¯k¯, zq. By
way of contradiction, suppose also that py¯k¯, zq ¡RTS py¯1, zq. Then the interval property of ¡RTS
guarantees that py¯k¯, zq ¡RTS py¯m, zq and so we obtain a violation of 2-consistency. For (B), since
py¯m, zq ÁRTS py¯m 1, zq, the interval property guarantees that py¯m, zq ÁRTS py¯1, zq. So we obtain the
cycle
py¯1, zq ÁRTS py¯2, zq ÁRTS ... ÁRTS py¯m, zq ÁRTS py¯1, zq (27)
which has length strictly lower than k¯. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain
py¯1, zq £RTS py¯2, zq £RTS ... £RTS py¯m, zq £RTS py¯1, zq
and so we can replace each ÁRTS in (27) by ÁRT . Furthermore, py¯m, zq £RTS py¯1, zq guarantees
that pym, zq £RTS py¯m 1, zq, by the interval property of ¡RTS. Therefore, py¯1, zq ÁRT py¯m 1, zq
and, by the interval property of ÁRT , we obtain py¯1, zq ÁRT py¯k¯, zq. 2-consistency then ensures that
py¯k¯, zq £RTS py¯1, zq. This completes the proof that (24) holds.
By definition, ÁRTST obeys SSCD if whenever y2 ¡ y1 and z2 ¡ z1 or y2   y1 and z2   z1,
py2, z1q ÁRTST py1, z1q ùñ py2, z2q ¡RTST py1, z2q.
We shall concentrate on the case where y2 ¡ y1; the other case has a similar proof. If py2, z1q ÁRTST
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py1, z1q, then by Lemma A3, there is y¯j (for j  1, 2, ..., k) such that
py2, z1q ÁRTS py¯1, z1q ÁRTS py¯2, z1q ÁRTS ... ÁRTS py¯k, z1q ÁRTS py1, z1q.
with y2 ¡ y¯1 ¡ y¯2 ¡ ... ¡ y¯k ¡ y1. Since ÁRTS obeys SSCD (see (19)), we obtain
py2, z2q ¡RTS py¯1, z2q ¡RTS py¯2, z2q ¡RTS ... ¡RTS py¯k, z2q ¡RTS py1, z2q
and so py2, z2q ¡RTST py1, z2q. QED
Our final step consists of constructing the SSCD preference that rationalizesO. SinceÁRÁRTST ,
it is clear that Lemma A2 has the converse: if there is a regular and SID preference Á on YZ that
obeys (21), then this preference rationalizes O. This observation, together with Lemma A4, suggest
that a reasonable way of constructing a rationalizing preference is to begin with ÁRTST and ¡RTST
and then complete these incomplete relations in a way that gives a preference with the required
properties. This is precisely the approach we take. Define the binary relation Á on Y  Z in the
following manner:
py2, zq Á py1, zq if py2, zq ÁRTST py1, zq
or py2, zq ‖RTST py1, zq and y1 ¥ y2, (28)
where py2, zq||RTST py1, zq means neither py2, zq ÁRTST py1, zq nor py1, zq ÁRTST py2, zq. The following
result completes our argument that (b) implies (c) in Theorem 1.
Lemma A5: Suppose that O obeys RM axiom. The binary relation Á is an SSCD preference that
rationalizes O. On every set K  Y that is compact in R and for every z P Z, BRpz,K,Áq is
nonempty and finite; in particular, Á is a regular preference.
Proof. We first show that Á is a preference that rationalizes O. Since ÁRTSTÁ by construction,
Á must rationalizeO. Furthermore, Á is complete and reflexive by construction, so to demonstrate
that it is a preference we need only show that it is transitive. Indeed, suppose
pa, zq Á pb, zq Á pc, zq Á pa, zq. (29)
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There are essentially four possible cases we need to consider:
Case 1. None of the three elements are related by ÁRTST . Given the definition of Á, this means
that a   b   c   a, which is impossible.
Case 2. pa, zq ‖RTST pb, zq, pb, zq ‖RTST pc, zq, and pc, zq ÁRTST pa, zq. Then (29) can only occur
if a   b   c, but if this is the case, the interval property of ÁRTST (Lemma A1) will imply that
pc, zq ÁRTST pb, zq. So this case is impossible.
Case 3. pa, zq ‖RTST pb, zq, pb, zq ÁRTST pc, zq ÁRTST pa, zq. This is impossible because, by the
transitivity of ÁRTST , we obtain pb, zq ÁRTST pa, zq.
Case 4. pa, zq ÁRTST pb, zq ÁRTST pc, zq ÁRTST pa, zq. By (24), this is only possible if
pa, zq ÁRT pb, zq ÁRT pc, zq ÁRT pa, zq,
but then we also obtain, by the transitivity of ÁRT , pa, zq ÁRT pc, zq and, hence, pa, zq Á pc, zq,
which establishes the transitivity of Á.
To show that Á obeys SSCD, let y2 ¡ y1 and z2 ¡ z1; then
py2, z1q Á py1, z1q ùñ py2, z1q ÁRTST py1, z1q
ùñ py2, z2q ¡RTST py1, z2q
ùñ py2, z2q ¡ py1, z2q,
in which the first implication follows from the definition of Á, the second implication from the
SSCD property of ÁRTST , and the third from the fact that ¡ contains ¡RTST (so Á extends
ÁRTST in the sense of (21)). The last claim is true because if py2, zq ¡RTST py1, zq, then Lemma A4
says that py1, zq ÃRTST py2, zq; thus py1, zq Ã py2, zq and we obtain py2, zq ¡ py1, zq.
It remains for us to show that, for every z P Z, BRpz,K,Áq is nonempty and finite, where
K  Y and K is compact in R. If K S yt for every t P T , then it follows from the definition of Á
that pm, zq Á py, zq, where m  minK and y P K. In this case, m is the only maximiser of Á in
K. Suppose that K Q yt for some t. Since there are a finite number of observations, we can find
some ys P K such that pys, zq Á pyt, zq for every yt P K. We claim that either m or ys is optimal
in K at the parameter value z, so that BRpz,K,Áq is nonempty and finite. Indeed, suppose there
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is y P K such that py, zq ¡ pm, zq. Then, since m   y, it must hold that py, zq ¡RTST pm, zq and
there is t P T such that y  yt, in which case we obtain pys, zq Á pyt, zq by the definition of ys. So
for all y P K, either pm, zq Á py, zq or pys, zq Á py, zq. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Let λ by a measure on Y with the following properties: (i) λpYq   8; (ii) on any nonempty
interval I of Y , λpIq ¡ 0; (iii) λptytuq ¡ 0 for all t P T . For any py, zq P Y  Z, we define
the set Lpy, zq  ty¯ P Y : py, zq Á py¯, zqu. This set is measurable since O is finite and IpYq
consists of compact intervals. Furthermore, λ is a finite measure (according to (i)), so λpLpy, zqq
is well-defined. We claim that upy, zq  λpLpy, zqq represents Á. It follows immediately from the
definition that upy2, zq ¥ upy1, zq if py2, zq Á py1, zq. So we need only show that upy2, zq ¡ upy1, zq
if py2, zq ¡ py1, zq. Suppose there exists an observed action, ys, such that ys P Lpy2, zqzLpy1, zq;
then upy2, zq ¡ upy1, zq since λptysuq ¡ 0 (by (iii)). If such an ys does not exist, then, in particular,
y2 R tytutPT . For y2 Á y1, it must be the case that py2, zq ‖RTST py1, zq and y2   y1. We claim that
there is a sufficiently small  ¡ 0 such that y2    y1 and for any y¯ P ry2, y2 s, py, zq ‖RTST py1, zq
and hence py¯, zq ¡ py1, zq. If this is true, ry2, y2   s is contained in Lpy2, zqzLpy1, zq and has
positive measure (by (ii)), so again upy2, zq ¡ upy1, zq. It remains for us to show that  ¡ 0
exists. If it does not exist, then there must be a sequence yn ¡ y2 and tending towards y2 such
that py1, zq ÁRTST pyn, zq (since, with a finite data set, it is impossible for there to be a sequence
yn tending y
2 such that pyn, zq ÁRTST py1, zq). This leads to py1, zq ÁRTST py2, zq, which is a
contradiction.38 QED
Proof of Theorem 2
It suffices to see that (b) implies (c). First, the SRM axiom guarantees that ÁRT is antisymmetric.
This in turn implies that ÁRTST is antisymmetric. By Lemma A5, Á, as defined by (28) obeys
SSCD and rationalizes O. Lastly, it is clear from its definition that py2, zq Á py1, zq and py1, zq Á
py2, zq only if py2, zq ÁRTST py1, zq and py1, zq ÁRTST py2, zq, but the latter is impossible. QED
Proof of Theorem 4
38In general, if a sequence yn tends to y
2 P Y, and py1, zq ÁRTST pyn, zq for all n, then py1, zq ÁRTST py2, zq.
Analogous closure properties are true of ÁRT and ÁRTS . It is straightforward to check that these properties follow
from the finiteness of the data set and the compactness of the sets in IpYq.
51
For each t P T , we may regard Pp|zt, Aq as an element of ∆ 
!
y P R|A|  :
°|A|
k1 yk  1
)
, and P
as an element of ∆T . We simplify our notation and denote Pp|zt, Aq by µt P ∆; a cross sectional
data set P can be written as P  tpµt, zt, AqutPT . We denote the set of paths obeying RM axiom
by Y; each path can also be regarded as an element of ∆T . Let ∆TRM (contained in ∆T ) be the set
of all possible tµtutPT such that tpµt, zt, AqutPT is stochastically rationalizable. By Theorem 3, this
set is the convex hull of Y. Since At  A for all t P T , Y consists precisely of those paths where
a higher parameter leads to a weakly higher action; it follows immediately from this that ∆TRM is
contained in ∆TFSD, the set of tpµt, zt, AqutPT that obey first order stochastic dominance in the sense
that µt ¥FSD µs whenever zt ¡ zs. Both ∆TRM and ∆TFSD are convex and compact sets in ∆T . The
Krein-Milman Theorem tells us that ∆TFSD is the convex hull of its extreme points; therefore, to
show that ∆TRM  ∆TFSD (as the theorem claims), we need only show that any extreme point of
∆TFSD is an element of Y. Equivalently, we shall show the following: if tµtutPT P ∆TFSD is not in Y,
then it is not an extreme point of ∆TFSD.
Suppose tµtutPT P ∆TFSD zY and for each t P T , let mt P A be the median of µt, i.e., mt 
inf
!
a :
°
a¤y µ
tpyq ¥ 0.5
)
. Let αt be a distribution defined in the following manner: αtpyq  2µtpyq
if y   mt; αtpyq  1 2°y mt µtpyq if y  mt; αtpyq  0 if y ¡ mt. We also define the distribution
βt: βtpyq  0 if y   mt; βtpyq  1 2°y¡mt µtpyq if y  mt; and βtpyq  2µtpyq if y ¡ mt. Clearly,
it holds that µt  0.5αt 0.5βt for all t. Since tµtutPT R Y, there exists t P T for which this convex
combination is non-degenerate; therefore, tµtutPT is not an extreme point of ∆TFSD if tαtutPT and
tβtutPT are both in ∆TFSD. We only show this for tαtutPT since the other case is similar. Suppose
zt ¡ zs for some s, t P T . Since tµtutPT is in ∆TFSD it must hold that ms ¤ mt. If a   ms ¤ mt, it
follows from tµtutPT P ∆TFSD that
¸
y¤a
αtpyq  2
¸
y¤a
µtpxq ¤ 2
¸
x¤a
µspyq 
¸
y¤a
αspyq.
If a ¥ ms, then °y¤a αtpyq ¤ °y¤a αspyq  1. We conclude that αt ¥FSD αs. QED
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Online Appendix (not part of main paper)
Data and testing procedures
We implement the results of Section 4 to a model of a binary entry game, with data from airline
markets. The data is taken from Kline and Tamer (2016). The empirical question concerns the
entry behavior of two kinds of firms: LCC (low cost carriers) and OA (other airlines). A firm that is
not an LCC is by definition an OA. The dataset comes from the second quarter of the 2010 Airline
Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B). It contains observations from 7882 markets that are defined
as trips between two airports irrespective of intermediate stops.
In Kline and Tamer’s analysis (and in ours) the two categories of firms are treated as two players.
So the LCC player (respectively OA) enters if some LCC (OA) firm enters the market. Thus in each
market, the two players (LCC and OA) can either both enter, both stay out, or one could enter
with the other staying out. The data set also contains information on two explanatory variables:
market presence (P) and market size (S). Market presence is a market- and airline-specific variable.
For each airline and for each airport, they count the number of markets that airline serves from
that airport and divide it by the total number of markets served from that airport by any airline.
The market presence variable for a given market and airline is the average of these ratios at the
two endpoints of the trip. Since the airlines are aggregated into two firms (LCC and OA), the
market presence variable is also aggregated: the market presence for the LCC firm (resp. OA firm)
is the maximum among the actual airlines in the LCC category (resp. OA category). The second
explanatory variable is market size, which is a market-specific variable (shared by all airlines in
that market) and is defined as the population at the endpoints of the trip. Lastly, Kline and Tamer
discretize the market size and market presence variables to take two values: 1 if the variable is
higher than its median value and 0 otherwise. Thus, for each market, the covariates are a triplet
PLCC, POA, S in the set product t0, 1ut0, 1ut0, 1u. The distribution at each observable covariate
is presented in Table 4 in the main paper.
55
Test and closest compatible distribution
Testing whether a data set is SID-rationalizable involves checking whether a linear system
Ax  B (30)
has a positive solution x. We describe next all the components of this system.
Matrix A: This matrix is composed of 0s and 1s. Each column describes the behavior (in terms of
choices) of a specific group path that satisfies the SRM axiom. Recall that a group path specifies the
profile of choices that the group makes for each possible vector of covariate values (or treatments).
Each row of A corresponds to one of the 32 possible combinations of (joint) entry choices and
treatment values. Since there are 482 group paths that obey the SRM axiom, A is a 32  482-
matrix. In Sheet “Consistent Paths” of the file “Matrices, Data, and Results.xlsx” (included with
this submission as a separate file) we describe all possible group paths for the entry game application;
all paths that satisfy the SRM axiom get number 1 in column SRM —SRM 1 and SRM 2 check
the SRM axiom for firm LCC and OA, respectively. In Sheet “Matrix A” of “Matrices, Data,
and Results.xlsx” we show how to construct matrix A in our application. We also considered the
case where a player is allowed to be indifferent between entering and not entering a market. When
indifferences are allowed, group paths must obey the RM (rather than SRM axiom) and the number
of paths increases to 1,809, so that A is a 32  1, 809-matrix. In these two sets of Sheets we write
NI if we do not allow for indifferences and I if we allow for them.
Vector B: The size of this column vector is 32. It is composed of 8 conditional probability
distributions. Each conditional distribution specifies the fraction of groups in the data that, for a
given treatment, make each of the four possible joint choices. Sheet “Data” of “Matrices, Data,
and Results.xlsx” describes all the information from the available data on the airlines that we use
to construct vector B, and shows how to construct it.
Vector x: This vector represents a probability distribution over the set of SID-rationalizable group
paths —whenever the system has a positive solution. In the entry game application, x has 482
entries when we do not allow for indifferences.
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We implement our test by using Matlab. Specifically, we use the built-in function
x  linprogplb, rs, rs, A,B, lb, rsq
to check whether system (30) has a positive solution in x. In this specification, inputs A and B are
described as above and lb corresponds to a column vector of zeros with the size of vector x. When
no solution exists, Matlab reports that the primal solution appears infeasible.
For those data vectors B that do not pass this test, we use built-in function “lsqnonneg” in Mat-
lab to find a positive vector px, with its components adding up to 1, that minimizes pB  Axq1 pB  Axq.
We refer to Apx as the closest compatible distribution of choices. Sheet “Results” of “Matrices, Data,
and Results.xlsx” describes the closest compatible vectors in columns “Closest” for the model that
does not allow indifferences and allows them, respectively.
Small sample inference procedure
As Kitamura and Stoye (2016) explain, the null hypothesis is equivalent to
H: minxPRK
 
pB  Axq1 pB  Axq  0
where K is the number of group paths. (In the entry game without allowing for indifference,
K  482.) A natural sample counterpart of the objective function in H is given by
 pB  Ax	1  pB  Ax	
where pB estimates B by sample choice frequencies. Normalizing the latter by sample size N , we
get
JN  N minxPRK
 
 pB  Ax	1  pB  Ax	 .
Let x be any solution to this problem. If Ax  pB, so that the observed choices are compatible
with our restrictions, then JN  0 and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Kitamura and Stoye (2016) propose the following bootstrap algorithm to test H:
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(i) Obtain a vector x that solves
JN  N minrxτN1K sPRK 
 pB  Ax	1  pB  Ax	
and compute pCτN  Ax. Here, 1K is a vector of 1s of dimension K.
Broadly following the practice in Kitamura and Stoye (2016), we report results for τN  0 and
for τN  5.15  107 
a
ln pNq {N{65, 536, where the denominator is the number of all possible
paths (including those that violate the RM axiom) and N  7882 (the sample size). (The tuning
parameter τN plays the role of a similar tuning parameter in the moment selection approach; in
Kitamura and Stoye (2016), it is required to satisfy two properties, namely, τN Ó 0 and
?
NτN Ò 8.)
(ii) Calculate the boostrap estimators under the restriction
pBprqτN  pBprq  pB   pCτN r  1, ..., R
where pCτN derives from step (i) and pBprq is a re-sampled choice probability vector obtained via
standard nonparametric boostrap. In addition, R is the number of boostrap replications. In our
paper, we let R  2000.
(iii) Calculate the boostrap test statistic by solving the following problem
J
prq
N pτNq  N minrxτN1K sPRK 
 pBprqτN  Ax	1  pBprqτN  Ax	
for r  1, ..., R.
(iv) Use the empirical distribution of J
prq
N pτNq, r  1, ..., R, to obtain the critical value of JN .
We repeat this procedure four times: for the model that does not allow indifferences (NI) and the
one that allows them (I) and we implement the test under two specifications of the τN -parameter.
For the airline application, we obtain the following p-values.
NI I
τN  0 0.150 0.307
τN  5.15  107 0.131 0.273
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In Sheet “Results” of “Matrices, Data, and Results.xlsx” we expand on these findings. In particular,
we also provide information regarding the closest compatible distribution for τN  0 (in column
“Closest”) and for τN  5.15  107 (in column “Closest τ”).
Bounds for subset of types
Suppose the dataset is consistent with our modeling restrictions, i.e., it passes the test in the previous
sub-section. This means that the set of types that our model allows can explain the observed choices.
In this context, we might also want to recover, from the data, the relative importance of a specific
subset of types allowed by the model. In general, this fraction can only be partially identified.
Recall that x represents a probability distribution over the set of all permissible paths. Let us
define a vector ρ of equal length with x, such that the entry in ρ is 1 on all those types included in
the subset of interest and 0 otherwise. For each x, the probability weight on the subset of interest
is just x1ρ. Let pC be the closest compatible distribution of choice data (if the dataset passes the
test, then pC is just pB). We can construct bounds for x1ρ by solving
minxPRK
 
!
x1ρ : Ax  pC) and maxxPRK
 
!
x1ρ : Ax  pC) .
The “Estimated Probability” in Tables 7 and 8 in the main paper is calculated in this way.
Finally, the confidence interval for the identified set can be constructed using a procedure de-
veloped in Deb, Kitamura, Quah, and Stoye (2017). Let θ P r0, 1s be a specific weight for the group
of interest. We can then use our previous test to verify whether this fraction is consistent with the
empirical evidence by adding the restriction x1ρ  θ to the initial hypothesis H. Bounds for the
relevance of a specific subset of types can be recovered by implementing the previous test for all
θ P r0, 1s and including in the confidence interval all those values of θ for which the p-value is above
5%. This test is relatively easily to carry out and we implement it to obtain confidence intervals
for various subsets of SID-rationalizable paths. The confidence intervals reported in Tables 7 and 8
of the main paper correspond to the case where the tuning parameter is set at zero but the results
are robust to small modifications of the tuning parameter.
59
